Clash at Clayoquot: Manifestations of Colonial and Indigenous Power in Pre-Settler Colonial Canada

(The Overlooked 1792 Journals of David Lamb and Jacob Herrick)

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The distinction between "settler colonialism" and "conquest colonialism," first articulated by Patrick Wolfe, has added nuance to the way historians have approached and understood the process of newcomer occupation of lands, displacement of indigenous people, and colonization of both. This scholarship has also opened a historiographical door inviting others to revisit the earlier fur-trade era—a time prior to full-blown settler colonialism during which colonial projections of military power were common. This article examines one particularly violent incident in this liminal period in North American colonialism—the largely overlooked 1792 deadly raid on a Nuu-chah-nulth settlement on Vancouver Island by British traders on the ship Butterworth. Using previously unavailable journals left by American observers of the incident, this article contributes to the re-situating of the scholarship of colonial encounters by highlighting the ways that these journal fragments open new interpretative opportunities. These texts allow us to better understand conquest and colonial relationships with indigenous people and especially the role that violence and ethnocentrism played on all sides. To assist future researchers, the authors have provided complete transcripts and created a map of the portions of the journals that describe this important clash at Clayoquot.[1]

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Inspired by the distinction Patrick Wolfe drew between North American "settler colonialism" and the "conquest colonialism" that was the norm in most other places Europeans colonized across the globe, historians have become better at discerning the nuances associated with the structural incursions into indigenous lands and lifeways in what is now Canada and the United States.[2] Recent complementary scholarship similarly reminds us that violence, and the threat of violence, nests at the heart of all colonial projections of power and works to facilitate the displacement of indigenous people from their lands and resources in ways that range from the subtle to the overt. These historiographical turns open interpretive doors through which we can additionally begin to revisit earlier periods of North American history (those prior to European settlement), where expressions of economic and political contestation operated somewhat distinctively from either formal conquest colonialism or settler colonialism proper. Building on this scholarship, we can begin to better elucidate the scope of the colonial agendas, forces, and methods deployed by Europeans over broad time periods and across vast geographic spaces.[3] More importantly, however, this historiographical turn opens avenues for understanding the range of adaptive strategies employed by indigenous people in the transitional years that followed the launch of European economic incursions but that preceded the colonists adopting a strategy of either cultural assimilation or social/physical displacement. That is to say, this approach invites an examination into the implications of violence on early indigenous-newcomer relations.

If recent scholarship is inviting historians to produce a more nuanced understanding of the impacts of multiple forms of colonialism, it is all the more exciting to conduct such analysis with the benefit of a previously unknown or overlooked historical manuscript and doubly so when that manuscript provides first-hand observations

students to partner with their faculty supervisors in finalizing a publication project upon which the faculty member had previously been working. We also are grateful to Kathy Griffin, archivist at the Massachusetts Historical Society, for the assistance she provided in reviewing and improving our early efforts at creating transcripts of the ship's logs.

[2] Settler colonialism is a form of colonialism where immigrants attempt to displace indigenous people in order to access and exploit land and resources as opposed to indigenous labor and resources. See Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event* (New York, 1999) and Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8 (December 2006): 387–409. More recently, Lorenzo Veracini provided settler colonial studies with a theoretical framework. See Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York, 2010). Adam Baker provided an overview of the current state of settler colonialism studies in "Locating Settler Colonialism," *The Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 13 (Winter 2012).

[3] See Annie Coombes, ed., *Rethinking Settler Colonialism: History and Memory in Australia, Canada, Aotearoa New Zealand, and South Africa* (Manchester, 2006) and Penny Edmonds, *Settler Colonialism and (Re)conciliation: Frontier Violence, Affective Performances, and Imaginative Refoundings* (London, 2016).

by dispassionate parties of a critical event in indigenous-newcomer relations about which we had previously known very little. Such is the case with the journal fragments of David Lamb and Jacob Herrick, officers on the Bostonian brig *Margaret*, who, in the summer of 1792, witnessed and eventually intervened in a bloody military conflict on Vancouver Island's west coast between crew members of the British ship *Butterworth* and residents of one of the settlements under the influence of the renowned Tla-o-qui-aht (Clayoquot) leader Wickaninnish. Having occurred in a context that does not easily fit into the categories of either settler or conquest colonialism, Lamb's and Herrick's eyewitness accounts together shed new light on the complexities of indigenous-newcomer relations at a time when the Northwest Coast was still a hotly contested social, economic, and political geography. Although European nations may have had aspirations for conquest and ultimately settlement of the region, none of the participants (with the exception of the Spanish who within months of this incident had in any case renounced their claims to the region) regarded themselves as acting as an avant-guard of settlement. Rather, as has been well documented, they saw themselves as independent economic agents whose range of options for securing the "soft gold" (sea otter pelts) ranged from gentle diplomacy to blatant theft backed by overt military violence.

Lamb's and Herrick's journals can be read as ethnographic text through which we are provided a real-time perspective on the performance of chiefly authority, the fragility of cross-cultural negotiated relationships, the pervasiveness of economic anxiety, and the extent to which violence was considered acceptable and normal within those relationships. Without these texts, all that was known about the 1792 clash came from the second-hand account of U.S. Captain Joseph Ingraham of the *Hope*. Captain Ingraham recounted that he first heard about the violent encounter at Clayoquot from the *Butterworth* off of Nootka Sound, where Captain William Brown reported that the Tla-o-qui-aht had attacked his ship without provocation.[4] After parting ways with the *Butterworth*, the *Hope* encountered the *Margaret*, under command of Captain James Magee, who relayed that Brown's men had raided one of Chief Wickaninnish's villages in an attempt to augment their cargo of sea otter pelts.[5] However, along with problems of brevity and hearsay, Ingraham's renowned hatred of all things British has called the objectivity of his description into question. As a result, despite its cost in terms of human lives and its negative impact on subsequent indigenous-newcomer relations throughout the region, the 1792 clash at Clayoquot has been largely overlooked.[6]

[4] F.W. Howay, "The Voyage of the Hope: 1790–1792," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (1920): 24.

[5] Mark D. Kaplanoff, ed., *Joseph Ingraham's Journal of the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of North America, 1790–92* (Barre, 1971), 224–7.

[6] Joshua L. Reid briefly mentions the violent encounter in *The Sea is My Country*. However, Reid uses Howay's "The Voyage of the Hope," which did not consider Lamb's and Herrick's journals. See Joshua L. Reid, *The Sea is My Country: The Maritime World of the Makahs* (New Haven, 2015), 41.

Through the writings of Lamb and Herrick, a much richer and more complicated story emerges. Their texts paint a vivid picture of the expression of British and U.S. economic colonialism on the fringe of British and U.S. empire and within an indigenous geography that, as Joshua Reid has recently reminded us, was a contested and fluid borderland where "specific social, economic, political, cultural, and environmental networks crossed. . . spaces, binding together borderland inhabitants and specific places."[7] We are told that shortly after dawn on August 5, 1792, Captain Brown of the private British trading vessel *Butterworth* ordered his crew to lower their longboats into the waters of a sheltered cove in Clayoquot Sound off Vancouver Island's west coast. Unable to obtain sea otter pelts on the open indigenous market, Brown had decided to acquire the precious commodities by force. At 8:00 a.m. small longboats departed the *Butterworth* en route for a sleeping settlement under the influence of the renowned regional leader, Chief Wickaninnish. Brandishing their muskets, the Englishmen stormed the beach and charged into the massive cedar longhouses. In the bloody conflict that followed, two Tla-o-qui-aht fell dead and three others were seriously wounded. Loaded down with pillaged goods, the British seamen beat a hasty retreat back to their boats and began pulling at their oars against the tide. Quickly, the startled Tla-o-qui-aht regrouped and launched a flotilla of much larger and faster cedar dugout canoes. The indigenous combatants rapidly closed the gap with the retreating Englishmen, all the while maintaining a steady volley of musket fire from their own well-stocked arsenal of western-manufactured arms. Within minutes one Englishman had fallen dead and two others lay seriously wounded in the bottoms of their whaleboats.

Beyond providing us with never-before recorded details of the encounter, Lamb and Herrick both also engage in a degree of reflection and interpretation that is unfortunately all too rare in extant descriptions of Northwest Coast indigenous-colonial military engagements in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Their writings are particularly useful in illustrating the complex motivations the various actors brought to the multinational interracial fur trade and therefore in giving a face to colonialism. In particular, they contribute to explicating what we know about the shift in Nuu-chah-nulth politics toward increasingly centralized chiefly power during the fur trade and about the complexity of inter-community relationships that leaders like Wickaninnish managed.[8] Through the journals' descriptions we are able to better appreciate the centrality of the threat of violence to Wickaninnish's political control and that violence was, in fact, a central feature of the mercantile exchange on Vancouver Island's west coast. But we also learn that prior to this particular incident there were rules and

[7] Reid, *Sea is My Country*, 14.

[8] In this article, *Nuu-chah-nulth* (Nootka) refers to the larger culturally-related indigenous peoples on the western coast of Vancouver Island. The Tla-o-qui-aht (Clayoquot) are a distinct tribal community within the Nuu-chah-nulth. We use the term *Clayoquot* as a geographical term in this essay to refer to the Clayoquot Sound region. We use *Tla-o-qui-aht* when referring to the people who lived in this cultural and geographic space.

protocols that indigenous people and newcomers alike had collaboratively worked out and that they generally respected. When Brown disregarded the system and deployed violence to acquire otter pelts, Wickaninnish had little choice but to use violence as well. To do otherwise would have empowered subsequent outsiders and undermined the system of regional political control he had worked so hard to establish with his indigenous neighbors. Conversely, restoring the system after both sides had resorted to military violence would require incredible self-restraint and sustained efforts at rebuilding trust and respect. As Lamb's and Herrick's journals reveal, both trust and respect were in short supply in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.

To enable others to make effective use of these unique historical sources, complete transcripts of the surviving portion of Lamb's diary and the relevant section of Herrick's journal describing the event and its aftermath are provided immediately following this essay. What makes complete texts so appealing in this instance is the unavailability of the originals and the confusion over the documents' authorship as inferred from the blotchy photocopies available at either the Massachusetts Historical Society or the Nantucket Historical Society.[9]

The incomplete entries of Lamb's diary commence on Monday July 30, 1792, as the *Margaret* sails northward along the coast of what is now Washington State, across the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and toward Clayoquot Sound. Unfortunately, after discussing the clash at Clayoquot, the journal fragment ends as abruptly as it began. The remnants of Herrick's diary cover a much broader period of the ship's travels but are punctuated by long gaps. What remains of Herrick's writings cover the *Margaret*'s departure from Boston, then jump to Clayoquot Sound, before leaping to a discussion of other events at Nootka Sound and the Queen Charlotte Islands. Herrick's second-hand accounts of a battle between the crew of the *Columbia* and Haida people, while interesting, offers nothing that cannot be found in other sources. For this reason, only the entries describing the Clayoquot incident have been transcribed here.

Keeping a diary was not exceptional for officers engaged in the maritime fur trade, but the unusual presence of a commissioned historian, John Howell, among the *Margaret*'s crew could only have contributed to the sense of importance that Lamb and Herrick felt about the venture. But whatever the reasons for these men's devotion to their journals we must be thankful, for Howell proved a disappointment to both his benefactors and posterity. Rather than "publish the occurrences" as intended, Howell

[9] The Massachusetts Historical Society lists Jacob Herrick as the author of both journals, while the Nantucket Historical Society identifies the first document as having being penned by David Lamb and the second by Herrick. We believe Nantucket is correct given the discrepancies between the two documents, and that it is unlikely Herrick would have written two separate and different accounts of activities for each entry. That said, the Massachusetts Historical Society's designation is based upon the fact that the name Jacob W. Herrick is writ large on the title page. Given that the originals are unavailable, it is impossible to tell from the photocopy whether Herrick's name was added later by another pen.

abandoned the vessel in China, apparently accompanying his ill-fated compatriot, John Kendrick, to Hawai'i, where the *Margaret*'s official historian disappears from the historical record.[10]

Together, Lamb's and Herrick's eyewitness accounts reveal much about the relationship between competing British and American traders a decade after thirteen of Britain's American colonies had declared their independence. While it has been recognized that nationality played a role in the way captains and crews of various ships treated one another, these men's journals demonstrate that personalities also played an important role. In the summer of 1792, the coast of Vancouver Island was still a relatively isolated location for westerners—the fringe of empire on the far side of the world. Indeed, the first American voyage to this frontier had occurred only four years earlier under Robert Gray and Kendrick in their respective ships the *Columbia Rediviva* and the *Lady Washington*. And indeed, it was only one week before the clash at Clayoquot that Britain's George Vancouver and Spain's Manuel Quimper had completed the first recorded circumnavigations of Vancouver Island (an act that finally lay laid to rest all hopes of identifying an ice-free Northwest Passage). Months away from Boston, London, or Madrid, traders were frequently obliged to rely on the generosity of another captain and crew, regardless of nationality, and in general scholars have regarded an us-them mentality as having characterized European and American thinking vis-à-vis their indigenous trading partners.

As Lamb's and Herrick's journals show, however, such loyalties of race were secondary considerations to both economic profit and personal safety, and indeed they were tempered by humanitarianism for they certainly did not deter the *Margaret*'s Captain Magee from vowing to withhold future assistance from Brown should the Tla-o-qui-ahts' accusations of cruelty prove true. Nor did racial loyalties define behaviors ten months later when Magee again "interposed and made peace" between a different indigenous group and Captain Vianna of the Portuguese brig *Feliz Adventurero*, Vianna having incurred the wrath of the local population after he "had taken" a young girl.[11] The extent to which Magee was motivated by compassion for the indigenous people is unclear from the journals. Regardless of his motivations, a recurrence (or what might be regarded by the Nuu-chah-nulth as an expansion) of hostility could, at least, threaten future trade profits. It could, as we see in the events that unfolded at Clayoquot, also result in violence and death. Fur traders, therefore, typically opted to operate within a decidedly precarious set of relationships that were often based less on race than on associations that reflected interpersonal respect and that enhanced profit.

[10] F.W. Howay, "The Ship Margaret: Her History and Historian," in *38th Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society for the Year 1929* (Honolulu, 1930), 34–40.

[11] Magee's actions against Vianna are mentioned in a fragmentary collection of log extracts pertaining to the *Margaret's* voyage. Miscellaneous Papers, vol. 2, Jeremy Belknap Collection, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

What is clear is that both Lamb's and Herrick's writings challenge the explanation of one-sided western exploitation of indigenous people and their resources, an explanation that dominated the historiography in the first half of the twentieth century.[12] The journals also indicate that the indigenous-European relationship in the early years of the Northwest Coast maritime fur trade was considerably more complicated than can be accommodated by the subsequent interpretation emphasizing indigenous agency and control of the cultural and technological exchange.

Northwest Coast scholars have long appreciated that early relations between maritime fur traders and the Nuu-chah-nulth vacillated between peaceful, socially engaged (and indeed sometimes even culturally enriching) encounters on the one hand, and overt premeditated and exploitative violence on the other. The scholarship describing these interactions has similarly fluctuated. Early historians such as H.H. Bancroft, E.O.S. Scholefield, and F.W. Howay typically highlighted allegedly savage acts of indigenous retaliatory violence against supposedly heroic historical explorers while early twentieth-century ethnographers the likes of Edward Sapir and his doctoral student Morris Swadesh interpreted contact-era Nuu-chah-nulth violence primarily within the context of retaliation and revenge for disobeying social trade protocol or unwarranted aggression.[13] Implicit in both the early histories and the salvage ethnographies was the idea that indigenous people quickly became dependent upon, and corrupted by, European technologies.

By the mid-twentieth century, however, new interdisciplinary studies shifted the focus away from social and political encounters and over to economic relations and their effects. Works like Joyce Wike's as-yet-unpublished, but highly influential, 1951 Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, "The Effect of the Maritime Fur Trade on Northwest Coast Indian Society," emphasized the pragmatic behavior of indigenous and newcomer traders alike, each of whom shrewdly sought to maximize their profits while minimizing costly conflicts.[14] Wike's analysis inspired one of the west coast's earliest interdisciplinary ethnohistorians, Wilson Duff, who in turn was an academic mentor to the historian Robin Fisher.[15] Indigenous agency was highlighted by these

[12] This interpretation of the early fur trade is most closely associated with the writings of Frederick "F.W." Howay.

[13] H.H. Bancroft, *History of British Columbia, 1792–1887* (San Francisco, 1887); E.O.S. Scholefield, *British Columbia from the Earliest Time to Present* (Vancouver, 1914), 117, 125–6; F.W. Howay, "Indian Attacks upon Maritime Fur Traders of the Northwest Coast, 1785–1805," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 6 (December 1925); F.W. Howay, ed., *Voyages of the "Columbia" to the Northwest Coast, 1787–1790 and 1790–1793* (Portland, 1990), 388–91; and Morris Swadesh, "Motivations in Nootka Warfare," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 4 (Spring 1948): 86.

[14] Joyce A. Wike, "The Effect of the Maritime Fur Trade on Northwest Coast Indian Society" (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1951).

[15] Wilson Duff, *The Indian History of British Columbia: The Impact of the Whiteman* (Victoria, 1964) and Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774–1890* (Vancouver, 1977).

scholars (perhaps excessively), as was the idea that indigenous cultural and artistic expressions became enriched by the adoption of European firearms and metal carving tools.

On balance, the proponents of the Enrichment Thesis, as it came to be known, claimed that indigenous societies embraced the opportunities associated with the sea otter trade, and that the new forms of wealth, coupled with western technologies, measurably "promoted and enhanced previous cultural forms" and resulted in the cultural flourishing of indigenous society.[16]

However, in emphasizing indigenous economic independence, scholars perhaps inadvertently created a false complementary image of indigenous political and military deference. Indeed, Wike herself was one of the first to acknowledge as much.[17] Within the Enrichment Thesis paradigm, incidents of colonial violence came to be regarded as aberrations, stemming primarily from a lack of cultural awareness on the part of some overly enthusiastic European traders.

Over the past several decades, studies have begun to show how uncomfortably such conclusions fit with the extant and emerging evidence. Barry Gough's analysis of overtly violent gunboat diplomacy against west coast indigenous populations in the mid-nineteenth century raised questions about the supposed peacefulness of the earlier maritime fur-trade period.[18] In subsequently documenting numerous acts of interracial violence found in eighteenth-century ship's logs, James Gibson's *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods* confirmed that the pacific relations paradigm was indeed unsustainable.[19] Gibson's 1992 study, however, was somewhat out of sync with the emerging ethnohistorical and critical theory–based studies that were then becoming the norm. His work focused almost exclusively on the European side of the association. This approach resulted in a somewhat glossed depiction of indigenous identities and geographies, which in turn seems to have reduced the impact of his revisionist argument.

Adding force to the conclusions drawn from Gough's and Gibson's empirical analyses, theoretically informed post-colonial explorations identified European nodes of power and coercion in places where the previous generation of scholars had seen principally indigenous agency. Daniel Clayton's *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* reinterpreted the early maritime fur trade as "an imaginative space stocked with commercial desire and cultural derision," and Cole Harris's seminal

[16] Robin Fisher defended the non-violent cultural enrichment thesis in "The Northwest from the Beginnings of Trade with Europeans to the 1880s," in *The Cambridge History of Native Peoples of the Americas*, vol. 1, part 2, *North America*, ed. Bruce G. Trigger and Wilcomb E. Washburn (New York, 1996), 135–48.

[17] Joyce Wike, "Problems in Fur Trade Analysis: The Northwest Coast," *American Anthropologist* 60 (December 1958): 86–101.

[18] Barry Gough, *Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846–1890* (Vancouver, 1984).

[19] James R. Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785–1841* (Montreal, 1992).

article, "Social Power and Cultural Change in Pre-Colonial British Columbia," alerted scholars to the value of engaging historical manuscripts as discursive literary texts—products of people who saw the world through particular class, gender, and national perspectives.[20] Harris's work was especially influential and helped people appreciate that European and American colonists actually created what could be considered a "culture of terror" among the indigenous people of the west coast. Lamb's and Herrick's relatively detailed diaries provide the sort of rich description that highlights the benefits of inductive reasoning while providing sufficient discursive detail to facilitate post-modern theorizing.

Scholars studying the early Pacific Northwest's contact period are still wrestling with the implications of a trade that served simultaneously as a unifying agent between indigenous people and newcomers and as a vehicle through which both sides expressed complex aspirations and ambitions that were sometimes incompatible with sustaining good relations. Viewing mercantile exchange in a social and cultural vacuum creates too narrow of a lens to fully acknowledge the dynamic systems to which each side of the trading table adhered. Indeed, as Robert Galois reminds us in his discussion of the journals of explorer James Colnett, "contact was no simple two-sided encounter. . . it involved a complex intersection of class, status, gender, and ethnicity."[21]

Reid's recent book *The Sea Is My Country* takes advantage of recent advances in interdisciplinary methods as well as historiographical changes. It inverts the perspective of the historian's gaze to highlight indigenous perspective, while not losing track of colonialism's coercive power. In Reid's view, the Northwest Coast of the late eighteenth century was a space in which the complexity of internal indigenous politics created a context for cross-cultural economic exchange that some outsiders were better able to negotiate than others. Thus, Reid tackles the complexity of the maritime fur trade by situating European outsiders as fleeting cultural and economic outsiders operating within complicated indigenous trade networks. He argues that these socio-economic-spatial regions predated European exploration and were dominated by powerful regional leaders, such as Wickaninnish (the Tla-o-qui-aht leader who features so prominently in the journals examined here), Macquinna (Mowachaht), and Tatoosh (Makah). Reid defines these spaces as "an Indigenous seascape characterized by particular borderlands networks and protocols."[22] As actors in such a space, European traders were principally identified with the valuable goods they carried, and as such were themselves considered resources to be managed within existing

[20] Daniel Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver, 2000), 77; R. Cole Harris, "Social Power and Cultural Change in Pre-Colonial British Columbia" *BC Studies*, no. 115/116 (Autumn/Winter 1997); and Anya Zilberstein, "Objects of Distant Exchange: The Northwest Coast, Early America, and the Global Immigration," *William and Mary Quarterly* 114 (October 2007): 591–620.

[21] Robert M. Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America: The Journals of James Colnett, 1786–89* (Vancouver, 2004), 30.

[22] Reid, *The Sea Is My Country*, 21.

indigenous trade networks. The potential of violence lurked behind the indigenous mercantile protocols that Brown and others were expected to follow. Reid brings to light many occasions when the potential was realized. He cites references to incidents of violence from Fort Astoria in the south to Cape Scott in the north. His work on indigenous maritime control and agency challenges historians to rethink theories that minimize violence, creating an ethnohistorical interpretive paradigm where theories, such as cultural enrichment or fluorescence, become subsidiary to the strategies people negotiated to mobilize power and access resources. It is within this complex web that Herrick's and Lamb's lost journals can be best evaluated.

While the violent 1792 encounter at Clayoquot is briefly mentioned in *The Sea Is My Country*, Reid did not have access to Herrick's and Lamb's journals. With the records at his disposal, Reid explains how Wickaninnish had traded for muskets, shot, powder, and a swivel gun with the American trader Kendrick earlier in 1792.[23] These were likely among the weapons mobilized by the Tla-o-qui-aht warriors who pursued the *Butterworth* raiding party during the Englishmen's retreat. Regardless of the scant discussion of this particular event, Reid's theoretical perspective enhances what we had already learned from Howay's and Gibson's earlier chronicling of violent encounters. We can now resituate Northwest Coast mercantilism, and thereby analyze the Herrick and Lamb journals with a much more critical lens. It is now possible to say with certainty that colonial mercantile violence was not anomalous but common. These journals provide eyewitness accounts of contestation at a moment in time where each side was experienced and well-versed in the other's trading protocols. Indeed, this was a moment when they had collectively (although in a non-coordinated way) created a hybrid system that reflected aspects of indigenous and European protocols and expectations. The journals serve as lenses to view the changing socio-cultural changes that were occurring on both sides of these transactions, allowing us to better assess British attitudes and actions on those occasions when certain historical figures determined that theft and violence should replace trade negotiations on the Northwest Coast.

With no less than twenty-six tall ships plying the waters off Vancouver Island in search of sea otter pelts, 1792 ranks as the busiest year in the Northwest Coast maritime fur trade.[24] Expanded activities, however, should not lead one to assume that this year was particularly unusual. Seven years into the fur trade, competition among the various non-native traders had crescendoed to a fevered pitch that would sustain itself with some geographical variation for decades to come. If European and American

[23] Ibid., 41.

[24] Our research has revealed that in addition to the twenty-one ships listed as having visited the Northwest Coast in 1792 by Gibson, there were at least five additional British plying the waters that year: the *Daedalus*, the *Alcoyn*, the *BBB*, the *William Henry*, and the *Hasmer Tame*. For Gibson's list see James R. *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast*, 1785–1841 (Montreal, 1992), 299–300.

traders, and their foreign technology, were initially regarded with a certain degree of wonder and awe by the diverse indigenous populations, the Lamb and Herrick diaries demonstrate that by 1792 such perceptions had been firmly replaced by reasoned understanding of the visitors' actual military strength, as well as their limitations and weaknesses.[25] Early indigenous markets for novel industrial goods quickly became saturated, enabling native consumers to pick and choose from among the variety of manufactured items offered them. Throughout the Pacific Northwest, ships' captains complained of the high prices the indigenous people commanded for their furs, and of their utter helplessness upon sometimes finding that their vessel's particular cargo had fallen from indigenous fashion and could not be exchanged at any price. These aspects of the maritime fur trade are well documented. In the absence of the information contained in these journals, what remained poorly understood were the motivations and aspirations of the various players in this evolving and always ambiguous set of cross-cultural relationships.

It is difficult to appreciate the dynamics and motivations of cultural communities involved in violent conflicts that took place over two hundred years ago, especially when our access to the indigenous voice is filtered through European text. For this essay we have made concerted efforts to connect with Tla-o-qui-aht people, and with the wider Nuu-chah-nulth community, to determine if there were any specific oral histories that they would be willing to share that could help us better understand this incident. We also provided them copies of the transcribed journals and of our early interpretation of the same in the hopes that their reflections might be able to help guide us. Through the anthropologist Jim Haggarty, we were introduced to Tla-o-qui-aht community member Joseph Tom who in turn tried to connect us with Tla-o-qui-aht Chief Ray Seitcher Jr. and other members of the Tla-o-qui-aht leadership and community. Unfortunately, busy schedules and a host of other pressing priorities prevented our Tla-o-qui-aht contacts from being able to assist us. In the meantime, we also searched to see if there were any earlier recorded oral histories in archival or unpublished ethnographic field note collections that might relate to the 1792 clash at Clayoquot. But while numerous oral histories have been preserved over the past century, we were able to identify none that related specifically to this incident.

In the absence of indigenous oral histories describing this particular event, we examined existing ethnographies and oral histories to try to create an indigenous cultural context for interpreting the Tla-o-qui-aht people's entanglement with Brown and his men. Sapir's and Swadesh's extensive ethnographic work documenting Nuu-chah-nulth oral history provides important perspectives on Nuu-chah-nulth violence

[25] Marshall Sahlins has rather persuasively demonstrated that a similar shift in understanding occurred among the Hawaiian population after prolonged exposure to Captain Cook and other Europeans. See Marshall Sahlins, *How "Natives" Think: About Captain Cook, For Example* (Chicago, 1995). For a counterargument see Gananath Obeyesekere, *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific* (Princeton, 1992).

and warfare in the late eighteenth century.[26] Their informants revealed that Wichanninish and his contemporaries viewed violence, raiding, and warfare through a framework of motivations. Indeed, Sapir's Nuu-chah-nulth informants repeatedly told him that violence was commonly used to retaliate against those who inflicted violence upon a person, family, or village.[27] The Nuu-chah-nulth described the appropriate avenue for violent revenge as retaliation for offenses such as "bullying and rough treatment, attempted murder, murder, a raid, inciting to raid. . . plundering or robbing."[28] These ethnographies make it clear that violence served as a response to aggression—violence was a reasonable response for stepping outside of trade protocols by stealing or plundering.

Nuu-chah-nulth oral histories further explain and contextualize the motivations of the Tla-o-qui-aht response to Captain Brown's aggression. Within Nuu-chah-nulth culture, Captain Brown and his retinue could be considered as having committed an offense that justified a violent response. Retaliation was not necessary, but it was "a universally accepted form of behavior."[29] According to local indigenous oral traditions, all options were discussed before any decision to respond was made. Proponents of responding to violence with violence often rooted their call to action in a discourse of saving face and protecting prestige.[30] The maintaining of prestige and power in the face of European aggression was among the most important motivators in contact-era Nuu-chah-nulth society. While the Tla-o-qui-aht likely did not hold a lengthy discussion the morning that Brown laid siege on the village, they responded by acting strictly within accepted Nuu-chah-nulth protocol. They rallied their warriors, loaded their muskets, and took to their canoes to exact revenge upon a violent assailant who broke established trade protocol.

Looking deeper into each journal keeper's personal history can provide additional context for the way the two journals describe incidents. While little is known of Lamb's or Herrick's lives and pedigrees, indications are they were typical of the young ambitious men who sailed as officers on New England trade ships. Existing records of the *Margaret*'s voyage show Lamb frequently stood in as ship's captain during the protracted periods Captain Magee was infirm. Lamb portrays himself as a thoughtful man; Herrick's corresponding journal shows that Lamb was respected by his shipmates. Lamb appears to have been among the select group of late eighteenth-century maritime fur traders who worked to earn the trust of the indigenous leaders they encountered. Men of this distinction—Bostonian merchant William Sturgis and the *Margaret*'s own Captain Magee to name but two—found voyages far more profitable

[26] Edward Sapir and Morris Swadesh, *Native Accounts of Nootka Ethnography* (New York, 1978).

[27] Swadesh, "Motivations in Nootka Warfare," 86.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., 91.

[30] Ibid.

and less hazardous when good relations were maintained with the local inhabitants. This practice was especially wise if one intended (as many did) to return to the coast for a subsequent season of trade.

The *Butterworth*'s Captain Brown, by way of contrast, has been depicted in the historical record as mean-spirited and cruel—a man who thought little of abusing his own crew or of sacrificing indigenous lives to turn a profit. It is known, for example, that the *Butterworth*'s surgeon, Sigismund Bacstrom, abandoned the tyrannical captain and sought refuge with the Spanish at Nootka soon after the clash at Clayoquot "on account of the ill and mean treatment I received from Cpt. W. Brown and his officers."[31]

Finding his first season on the Northwest Coast less than profitable, Brown, like many others, had been forced to extend his voyage. While waiting for the return of good weather, the four-hundred-ton *Butterworth* and her two consorts, the sloops *Jackal* and *Prince Lee Boo*, over-wintered at the Hawaiian Islands, where Brown quickly apprised himself of opportunities to secure financial rewards by meddling in indigenous Polynesian politics.[32] According to both British and U.S. observers, while at Hawai'i Brown unscrupulously traded defective firearms, tainted powder, and substandard ammunition, to both Kamehameha as well as to the famous Hawaiian king's archrival Kahekili. Moreover, Brown is believed to have played a key role in actually encouraging the Hawaiian Islands' bloody internal conflict, and, on at least one occasion, joined in the battles himself as a mercenary. Commenting on the ignoble nature of the *Butterworth*'s captain's career, one twentieth-century historian has described Brown's ultimate death at the hands of Hawaiian warriors as "just retribution." Herrick and Lamb show that such judgments are not without cause, that they were widely shared by Brown's contemporaries, and that Brown's disreputable behavior was not limited to his time in the mid-Pacific.[33]

For British and American traders of the late eighteenth century, these events occurred on the distant coast of a still largely unknown continent. But if this region was removed from Europe and the U.S. eastern seaboard, it was at the center of the Tla-o-qui-aht people's world. Moreover, while the Boston/London–Northwest Coast–China triangle of trade forged by the London and Boston traders had significant social and economic consequences for the western and Asian economic metropoles, it was even more significant for the Nuu-chah-nulth. The historical anthropologist Marshall

[31] Douglas Cole, "Sigismund Bacstrom's Northwest Coast Drawings and an Account of his Curious Career," *BC Studies*, no. 46 (Summer 1980): 66.

[32] Ralph S. Kuykendall, "A Northwest Trader at the Hawaiian Islands," *The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* 24 (June 1923): 112.

[33] Kuykendall, "A Northwest Trader," 115. Kuykendall surveys the relevant journals to construct a fairly complete image of Brown's infamous Hawaiian actions. His success stems largely from the fact that Brown's visits to Hawaii correspond with those of Captain Vancouver (the *Chatham* and *Discovery*) and Captain Kendrick (the *Columbia* and *Lady Washington*). As a result, we have long had a much clearer picture of Brown's actions at Hawaii than his actions on the Northwest Coast.

Sahlins has interpreted how the introduction of the global sandalwood trade (which in fact was an offshoot of the Northwest Coast maritime fur trade and involved many of the same London and Boston traders) caused shifts in the extent and expression of chiefly power. But this was not wholesale innovation and change. Rather, it was an example of historical change within broader cultural continuity. Sahlins posited that the opportunities associated with the new trade caused certain elements of the structures of Hawaiian culture to become enhanced. Hawaiian chiefs had long controlled sandalwood, but the introduction of a global market enabled them to leverage that chiefly prerogative and to project a new form of power.[34]

On Vancouver Island, similarly, Chief Wickaninnish had inherited a suite of chiefly powers from his ancestors, among which was the prerogative to control important aspects of his community's trade with outsiders. The scale of the western traders' hunger for sea otter pelts, however, had no precedent in Nuu-chah-nulth history and pushed the Nuu-chah-nulth traditions in new directions. The ethnographer Philip Drucker's Tla-o-qui-aht informants told him that Wickaninnish, formerly known as "Ya'aistohsmalni," united several smaller tribes in the early years of the Maritime trade and executed several well-planned raids on the La'o'kwath, who had occupied the land adjacent to Wickaninnish's holdings near Opitsit.[35] When John Meares encountered Wickaninnish in September of 1788, he described the Tla-o-qui-aht chief as living in "a state of magnificence much superior to any of his neighbours both loved and dreaded by the other chiefs. His subjects as he informed us, amounted to about thirteen thousand people."[36] While anchored at Clayoquot, Meares was visited by Wickaninnish, who brought with him "a great number of people from the town [Opitsit], who attended their chief, in order to gain another opportunity of trading with us; and no small quantity of furs were, at this time, procured from them."[37]

There is no question that by the late 1780s Wickaninnish had become an important figure on the West Coast of Vancouver Island, vying for authority vis-à-vis a handful of other regional leaders. As Drucker has discussed, the sheer scale of the sea otter trade also encouraged some Nuu-chah-nulth commoners to break with tradition by trying to bypass their chiefs and trade directly with the newcomers so as to keep the new wealth for themselves—innovative initiatives that Wickaninnish, Macquina, and Tatoosh were quick to stifle. Lamb's diary suggests that the consolidation of economic and political power may have been accentuated by the anxiety that Wickaninnish and other chiefs experienced over their people's conflict with ships like the *Butterworth*.

[34] Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History* (Chicago, 1985).

[35] Ya'aistohsmalni took the name Wickaninnish sometime after completing his conquest around the Kennedy Lake Region. See Philip Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes* (Washington, 1951), 240.

[36] John Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North West Coast of America* (London, 1790), 230.

[37] Ibid., 205.

Indeed, other archival documentation shows that within two years of this particular clash at Clayoquot it had become standard procedure for all indigenous people within several hundred kilometers of Clayoquot Sound to conduct their trade exclusively through Wickaninnish.[38]

For Maquinna, Wickaninnish's Mowachaht neighbor, relative, and sometimes rival, European contact and subsequent trade allowed him to consolidate control over the Nootka Sound region. As the ranking chief of the Mowachaht, Maquinna had ample access to sea otter pelts and was thus able to control much of the access to European goods, especially firearms.[39] But European presence and influence were not the only things that facilitated his position of authority over the Mowachaht. Indigenous politics created a situation where Maquinna could restrict access to Europeans. He was therefore able not merely to solidify but to profoundly increase his regional authority.[40]

Some context for such regional influence can be drawn from the history of indigenous-newcomer relations among other groups on the Northwest Coast. The archaeologist Andrew Martindale argues that the European presence in the Pacific Northwest facilitated the rise of powerful regional leaders among the Tsimshian.[41] Martindale contends that only with the "new mechanisms of generating wealth through the introduction of the European market economy" were indigenous regional leaders able to consolidate control over increasingly larger swaths of trade-territories and populations.[42]

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[38] Philip Drucker, "Wealth, Rank and Kinship in Northwest Coast Society," *American Anthropologist* 41, no. 1 (1939): 55–65; Erna Gunther, "A Re-evaluation of the Cultural Position of the Nootka," in *Men and Cultures: Selected Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Philadelphia, 1956*, ed. Anthony F. C. Wallace (Philadelphia, 1960), 274; Drucker, *Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes*, 243–77, 311–22; and Susan Kenyon, "The Nature of the Nootkan Local Group; Kinship and Descent on the West Coast of Vancouver Island," March 1976, Conference on Northwest Coast Studies papers, MS-1308, BC Archives, Victoria.

[39] For example, in January 1793, indigenous people of Barkley Sound, just south of Clayoquot Sound, told the crew of the *Jefferson* that they could not trade with Europeans because Wickaninnish of Clayoquot conducted all their trade for them. See *Unpublished Log of Bernard Magee while on board the Jefferson, 1793–1794,* MS-1428, BC Archives, Victoria (hereafter Unpublished Magee Log).

[40] Galois, *Voyage to the North West Side,* 37–8.

[41] Andrew R.C. Martindale, "A Hunter-Gatherer Paramount Chiefdom: Tsimshian Developments Through the Contact Period," in *Emerging from the Mist: Studies in Northwest Coast Culture History,* ed. R.G. Matson, Gary Coupland, and Quentin Mackie (Vancouver, 2003), 12.

[42] Martindale, "A Hunter-Gatherer Paramount Chiefdom," 13. In addition, examining the Nuu-chah-nulth's neighbours to the southeast, archaeologist Colin Grier states that by the Marpole Era (2500-1000 BP), Coast Salish peoples living in the Gulf of Georgia region had developed increasingly complex socio-political systems, rather than networks based solely on trade and exchange. For Grier, Coast Salish networks were becoming increasingly regional in scope long before European contact, spreading not just trade goods and wares, but power and control. See Colin Grier, "Dimensions of Regional Interaction in the Prehistoric Gulf of Georgia," in *Emerging From the Mist: Studies in Northwest Coast Culture History,* ed. R.G. Matson, Gary Coupland, and Quentin Mackie (Vancouver,

Clearly, all the cross-cultural encounters associated with the maritime sea otter trade involved projections of power between people with different (and somewhat internally contested) entrenched rules and obligations. Europeans expected to gain access to sea otter pelts. They had invested heavily, travelled far, and brought with them trade goods that they expected would hold import and value to indigenous traders. Trade leaders like Wickaninnish expected to trade their community's pelts for goods and wares that either were symbols of wealth (for example, iron files and looking glasses) or that could be used to secure additional wealth and power (for example, guns, cannon, shot, and powder). The key difference between these two trade parties was that at the peak of trade in the early 1790s indigenous leaders like Wickaninnish recognized that, so long as his community members followed protocol and funneled trade through himself as chief, he and his community held significant power vis-à-vis the newcomers. By consolidating pelts in longhouses within settlements he controlled, Wickaninnish understood that he could control supply and therefore demand higher prices from particular ships by threatening to simply wait until another trading vessel arrived.

British and American traders, by way of contrast, had the advantage that the Nuu-chah-nulth could not access the manufactured goods on their own and therefore needed the western traders. But working against them was that fact that the Bostonians and Londoners were individual traders in competition with one another. While the various European traders commonly worked within a standardized system of protocols, coordination and cooperation was infrequent, and when it occurred, fleeting. Being far from their supply centers, the westerners needed to trade in as quickly as possible in order to reach safe harbor and markets before winter storms set in or provisions dwindled. Additionally, they always feared the next ship would undercut their price or arrive with a new commodity that was more popular.

Many recognized Wickaninnish as an important ally in gaining access to European traders and their goods and for selling their wares to the newcomers. On the eve of the violent encounter at Clayoquot in 1792, Wickaninnish was confident in his ability to conduct business with men like Captain Brown of the *Butterworth*. And while many European traders ethnocentrically viewed Wickaninnish as their social

2003), 177. Many Coast Salish Indigenous societies were complex and stratified, and regional networks existed both in affinal and political spheres of influence before European arrival. The ethnographer Wayne Suttles argued that the most important Coast Salish social bonds were created and maintained to secure access to resources and social capital. For a detailed discussion on Suttles and the social and political changes to Coast Salish societies, see Keith Thor Carlson, *The Power of Place, The Problem of Time: Aboriginal Collective Identity and Historical Consciousness in the Caldron of Colonialism*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 40–51. By developing social and political bonds extra-communally, Coast Salish family leaders ensured that they would have access to a diverse array of resources and political alliances, should they need to call on them in a time of scarcity or need. Under this system, certain Coast Salish men, who had access to profitable ancestral resource sites or inherited social status, were able to attain more regional power.

and cultural inferior, they had no option but to respect him for his economic acumen and growing military power.

The importance of individual personality stretched well beyond shaping aspects of indigenous-European military relations. Lamb's diary clearly shows that certain maritime traders were indeed capable of escaping such culturally prescribed notions as a Eurocentric definition of market exchange—however, it just as clearly demonstrates that others were not. In the mercantilist late eighteenth century the idea of initiating commercial transaction with non-reciprocal gift exchange must have been difficult for either U.S. or British maritime traders to appreciate. Yet, from the indigenous Nuu-chah-nulth perspective, such exchanges were regarded as necessary prerequisites to any subsequent trade where profit was sought. To the indigenous population, preliminary gifts carried great cultural significance, and at a minimum were regarded as necessary tokens of a trader's good will. Usually such gift exchanges worked to a European trader's disadvantage, since much less was received for a gift than in subsequent so-called straight trading.[43]

Moreover, European preconceptions of the way supposed primitive societies were organized no-doubt also added to the confusion men of Brown's ilk experienced as they sought to make sense of Nuu-chah-nulth exchange protocols. Those Nuu-chah-nulth who received preliminary gifts from Brown may have perceived the goods and the motivations behind their giving in terms that were quite different from what Brown intended.

Judging from Lamb's descriptions, it seems likely that at the time of Brown's arrival Wickaninnish's economic power was still growing but that the regional monopoly he is known to have eventually established may not yet have been firmly established. Depending upon who Brown gave his gifts to, and in what manner he gave them, they may have been regarded by members of the Tla-o-qui-aht community as incurring reciprocal obligations for barter only with representatives of individual families and not as precursors to subsequent community-wide commercial exchange. Thus, while violence of the kind visited on the Tla-o-qui-aht people by Brown may not have caused the emergence of powerful regional chiefs, there can be little doubt that it reinforced for the Nuu-chah-nulth the merits of funneling their foreign exchange through chiefs who possessed the military might to retaliate.

Lamb's own insightful analysis, along with detailed observations of Brown's violent behavior, supports such an interpretation. From the Tla-o-qui-aht, Lamb learned that for two days prior to the *Margaret*'s arrival, Brown's men had been aggressively demanding pelts from the indigenous population as payments for their earlier gifts—

[43] See William Sturgis, second lecture, 6–9, unpublished lectures, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston and Unpublished Magee Log. Elaborate gift exchange customs as prerequisites to market exchange were not unique to the Northwest Coast. Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman have documented similar practices between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Ojibwa and Cree. See Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman, *'Give Us Good Measure': An Economic Analysis of Relations Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763* (Toronto, 1978), 60–1.

oddly never provoking serious retaliation. Due to the fickle nature of eighteenth-century supply and demand on the Northwest Coast, Brown likely found himself stuck with a cargo of trade goods that Wickaninnish's people did not want. This dilemma forced Brown to give away items he otherwise would have been compelled to return with to England. Lamb indicates that Brown believed that dumping large quantities of low-demand gifts would endear him to Wickaninnish enabling him to carry on enough subsequent trade to at least break even financially. But, with the arrival of the *Margaret*, Brown feared that Wickaninnish would trade pelts to his competitors, even though Brown felt that Wickaninnish owed the pelts to him. In this context, Brown rationalized force and violence that he otherwise might have considered excessive.

Another explanation, from a potentially more indigenous perspective, may be derived through ethnographic contextualization. Scholars have argued that eighteenth and early nineteenth century Nuu-chah-nulth people may initially not have appreciated or recognized the national and personal distinctions of Westerners. To explain many of the supposedly unprovoked indigenous attacks, these scholars suggest that indigenous may have responded to one European trader's mistreatment of a particular chief or people by avenging themselves on the next trading vessel to visit those waters. According to this interpretive model, the indigenous people initially saw all Europeans as coming from the same place or belonging to the same kin group. As Gibson writes, "they saw all whites as belonging to one tribe, and therefore sharing in the guilt of any of its members."[44] More than seventy years after the 1792 incident at Clayoquot, Gilbert Malcolm Sproat (Land Commissioner for the Joint Indian Reserve Commission from 1876-1880) described the 1864 retaliatory actions of the British Royal Navy against the Tla-o-qui-aht for the suspected murder of "white traders," in terms of the Nuu-chah-nulth people having drawn a "curious distinction. . . between the crews of the [contemporary] Queen's ships on the one hand and the great King George tribe [English non-seafarers] on the other—believing the people in the ships to be a separate tribe by themselves."[45]

Certainly, this interpretation has been advanced as the leading explanation for Macquina's 1803 attack on the *Boston* ever since John R. Jewitt, one of the two European survivors, first expressed it.[46] Historians have also associated it with

[44] Gibson, *Otter Skins*, 165.

[45] Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, *The Nootka: Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, ed. Charles Lillard (Victoria, 1987), 136.

[46] See Hilary Stewart, *The Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt, Captive of Maquina* (Vancouver, 1987), 22 and John R. Jewitt, *A Journal, Kept at Nootka Sound, by John R. Jewitt, One of the Surviving Crew of the Ship Boston, of Boston* (1807; repr. New York, 1976). In the decades following the Brown-Wickaninnish affair, more traders adhered to this belief. In his lectures, the northwest coast maritime trader William Sturgis placed great emphasis on this explanation for indigenous hostilities. See Sturgis, third lecture, unpublished lectures, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. For a more contemporary spin on this old historical explanation see Inglis and Haggarty, "Cook to

Wickaninnish's subsequent destruction of the *Tonquin* in 1811.[47] Considered in this light, in 1792 Wickaninnish may have deliberately deceived Brown in retaliation for insults incurred earlier that year from Captain Gray and the men of the *Columbia*. Gray had departed Clayoquot Sound only two months earlier, after over-wintering on Meares Island, and it is known that relations between Gray and Wickaninnish had steadily deteriorated. Indeed, John Boit, the *Columbia*'s fifth mate, stated that the relationship had become so strained that on Gray's orders he and other seaman from the Columbia razed Wickaninnish's village of Opitsit to the ground.[48]

The description of the conflict found in the *Margaret*'s officers' journals also helps place in perspective the relative powers of the westerners vis-à-vis their Tla-o-qui-aht trade partners. Captain Brown, working within the confines of eighteenth-century British ethnocentrism, may have permitted his anger and contempt toward the people he perceived as savages to justify his forcibly taking otter pelts from the Tla-o-qui-aht, and even killing those who resisted. But at the same time, judging by Lamb's description of the British longboat's panicked retreat, Brown's men were clearly no match for Wickaninnish's forces once they collectively asserted themselves.

Similarly, western maritime traders had no way of regulating each other's actions. For instance, after firing the perfunctory cannon ball, the *Margaret*'s Captain Magee could do little more than lecture his English counterpart on the just treatment of indigenous people. Clearly he had no way of controlling Brown's subsequent atrocities against indigenous fishermen, when, as we learn from Ingraham, the retreating Brown enticed nine unsuspecting Tla-o-qui-ahts (including a brother of Wickaninnish) on board the *Butterworth* and then proceeded to have them whipped "in a most

Jewitt: Three Decades of Change in Nootka Sound," in *Le Castor Fait Tout: Selected Papers of the Fifth North American Fur Trade Conference, 1985*, eds. B. Trigger, T. Moranz, and L. Dechene, 208–13.

[47] Gibson, *Otter Skins*, 168.

[48] Boit's own log entry states he was "sent with three boats, all well man'd and arm'd, to destroy the village of Opitsatah. It was a command I was in no way tenacious off, and am grieved to think Capt. Gray shou'd let his passions go so far. . . This fine Village, the Work of Ages, was in a short time totally destroy'd." Oddly, neither of Boit's two crew mates who kept journals mention the destruction of the village. Indeed, Robert Haswell, Gray's first mate, and John Hoskins, simply note in their diaries that on the day Boit claims to have destroyed the village the weather was "more rigorous" than it had been all winter, including "heavy squals with thunder and lightning and sleet" most of the day, followed by "heavy rains." Furthermore, the *Columbia* and her crew remained in Clayoquot Sound an additional six days. Had Boit actually destroyed the village it is unlikely Gray would have endangered the men and ships by remaining in the area and it is even less likely that the powerful Wickaninnish would have allowed them to remain. Indeed, Captain Gray allegedly told Captain George Vancouver of *HMS Discovery* that, while at Adventure Cove, he was attacked by "three or four tribes numbering 3000." Hoskin's diary does not quite confirm this statement. He simply describes what appeared to have been an aborted attack on Ft. Defiance. F.W. Howay, *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787–1790 & 1790–1793* (Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990), 390–1, 278, 315; C.F Newcomb ed., *Menzies Journal of Vancouver's Voyage, April to October 1792* (Victoria, BC, Printed by Authority of the Legislative Assembly, 1923); and Howay, *Voyages of the Columbia*, 267–74.

unmerciful manner" by Hawaiian crew members. Having vented his anger, Brown then tossed the nearly dead people overboard, whereupon Captain James Baker, following in the *Jenny* ordered the suffering men shot.[49]

Wickaninnish, while enjoying numerical superiority over the independent and competing European traders, could never be sure that an alliance of race would not prevail in the eyes of the outside fur traders, should violence become more widespread. Moreover, he recognized that he was dependent upon the westerners for the supply and maintenance of all his European and Asian manufactured products, in particular firearms, shot, and powder. Thus, despite his having acquired a virtual armory of muskets and light artillery, Ingraham tells us that Wickaninnish did not pursue the issue with Brown beyond asking for the return of the missing fishermen, whom he supposed had been taken prisoner rather than whipped and killed.[50] According to this account, Wickaninnish appears to have prioritized securing a continued supply of western wares. Apparently, he appreciated that had he launched a large-scale assault on the *Butterworth*, other European traders—fearing for their own safety—would have avoided Clayoquot Sound. This proposition is supported in Herrick's own interpretation of Wickaninnish's motives in asking for hostages from the *Margaret* the day following Brown's attack.

Significantly, some scholars suggest that such a compromise would have been inconsistent with the indigenous requirement to seek balance in relationships, including the role played by vengeance, under certain circumstances, in re-establishing balance. This social system demanded that acts of violence by outsiders (indigenous or European) be returned in kind.[51] Yet Lamb and Ingraham indicate that such reprisal did not necessarily occur when Wickaninnish perceived his future access to artillery

[49] The Jenny was a British schooner, of Bristol, 78 tons owned by Sidenham Teast. F. W. Howay, *A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1785–1825*, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, ON, 1973), 16. Ingraham claims he was told this story by Captain Magee and then had it confirmed by the *Jenny's* second mate. See Kaplanoff, *Joseph Ingraham's Journal*, 225–6.

[50] Captain James Colnett reported in 1790 that Wickaninnish had as many muskets as the *Argonaut*, as well as four or five thousand warriors at his disposal. See F.W. Howay, *The Journal of Captain James Colnett Aboard the "Argonaut" from April 16, 1789 to November 3, 1791* (Toronto, 1940). In January 1794 Wickaninnish purchased two brass swivel guns from the *Jefferson*. See Unpublished Magee Log. Ramon Saavedra at the Spanish garrison at Nootka reported in 1794 that Guiquisnanis [Wickaninnish] purchased "two mortars with ten cartridges and a number of mortar-balls of the proper caliber" from Captain Joseph Rover [Josiah Roberts] of the ship *Efans* [*Jefferson*]. See Ramon Saavedra, "Informe de lo ocurrido en Noutka del 7 de Junio de 93 al 15 de Julio de 94," in "Official Documents Relating to Spanish and Mexican Voyages of Navigation, Exploration, and Discovery Made in the Eighteenth Century," ed. and trans., Mary Daylton, A/A/10/M57t, BC Archives, Victoria. Edward Bell, sailing with Captain Vancouver in 1792, wrote that he heard Wickaninnish had 400 muskets. See Edmond S. Meany "A New Vancouver Journal," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (1915) and Kaplanoff, *Joseph Ingraham's Journal*, 225.

[51] Drucker, *Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes*, 332–54 and John Phillip Reid, "Principals of Vengeance: Fur Trappers, Indians, and Retaliation for Homicide in the Transboundary North American West," *Western Historical Quarterly* 24 (February 1993).

and firearms (which were a means of retaining or expanding his economic, social, and political authority) might become jeopardized. In this regard, Wickaninnish acted in a manner that would have been familiar to his Hawaiian counterpart Kamehameha, who was likewise in the process of consolidating political control over a Pacific island. That is to say, it appears that Wickaninnish's broad economic and political responsibilities sometimes compelled him to place other interests ahead of his familial honor.

Considered together, the fragmentary remains of Lamb's and Herrick's diaries contribute a richer understanding of late eighteenth-century indigenous-newcomer relations. More importantly, however, they also challenge the validity (or at least usefulness) of interpretive categories like "enrichment," and its revisionist counterpart "culture of terror," that have been used to define indigenous experiences and their complex social, economic, and political interactions with newcomers in the early contact era. Over half a century ago, when speaking of the historian's propensity for viewing the past as consisting of either good or bad periods, the historical philosopher R.G. Collingwood argued that "the distinction between periods of primitiveness, periods of greatness, and periods of decadence, is not and never can be historically true. It tells us much about the historians who study the facts, but nothing about the facts they study."[52] Similarly, the historian George Miles observed that ethnohistorical writings in particular have created paradigms (anchored around categorized periods) that their practitioners find difficult to escape.[53] Citing Edward Burner, Miles refers to the way that prior to World War II most writing depicted the native present as disorganized, the past as glorious, and the future as assimilated. Subsequently, ethnohistorians have almost universally envisioned the indigenous present as a resistance movement, the past as exploitation, and the future as ethnic resurgence.[54] Lamb's and Herrick's journals invite us to rethink this narrative structure and to look more closely at the specifics of indigenous history in the early years of contact with outsiders.

In Canada, the interpretive framework for indigenous historical experience on the west coast has generally been defined as contact-era enrichment shifting to settlement-era conflict (and marginalization), while in the twentieth century it has undergone the shift from early Indian resistance to contemporary indigenous renewal. Such depictions portray indigenous and European culture in antithetical terms. This paradigm, Miles maintains, creates plots that make it virtually impossible to imagine indigenous people as significant participants in history rather than merely as interesting foils for the history of newcomers. More to the point, one might invert Miles's concerns and argue that the current mode of ethnohistorical emplotment has also largely

[52] R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (London, 1961), 327.

[53] George Miles, "To Hear an Old Voice: Rediscovering Native Americans in American History," in *Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America's Western Past*, ed. William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin (New York, 1992), 52–70.

[54] Miles, "To Hear an Old Voice," 54–5 and Edward Burner, "Ethnography as Narrative," in *The Anthropology of Experience*, ed. Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Burner (Urbana, 1986), 39.

prevented colonial history from being incorporated into indigenous history in anything but the same manner.

Close dialogic readings of first-hand contact-era documents that record indigenous voices, as the Lamb and Herrick diaries do, may offer a means of escaping this dilemma. These sources allow historians and contemporary indigenous community members the opportunity to begin not only viewing indigenous experience as an aspect of western history but also viewing European experience as an aspect of a dynamic, unfolding, indigenous history. This latter perspective must be closer to what men like Lamb and Herrick themselves experienced while sailing off the coast of Vancouver Island, months from London and Boston.

In light of this evidence, the interpretive paradigms of either enrichment or violence appear somewhat inadequate. The complexities of indigenous-newcomer relations during the Maritime fur trade necessarily render attempts at overarching interpretive models into caricatures. As such, perhaps the proper subject of historical inquiry is, as Collingwood asserts, not periods but problems.[55]

Analysis of Lamb's and Herrick's hitherto overlooked accounts of the *Butterworth*'s attack, and their associated summaries of subsequent conversations with both the victims and perpetrators of the attack, raise important questions. For example, to what extent was the westerner's violence considered typical (or expected) by the Nuu-chal-nuth? Were the British generally more violent than the Americans? If so, what extant political motivators encouraged violent behavior toward indigenous traders on the edge of empires and within the borderlands of contested power? Did the violence associated with this incident create a form of colonial interaction that was different from that associated with conquest colonialism or that which subsequently emerged under Canadian settler colonialism? Indeed, the context in which the violent encounter at Clayoquot unfolded, at a time when indigenous and European powers jockeyed for control over both local and distant mercantile others, does not fit neatly into either interpretive framework. Perhaps, given the social capital required to maintain courteous and productive trade relationships and to avoid incidents such as this one, we need to consider the possible limitations that a colonial framework might have in digesting these complex mercantile realities. Thus, while the accounts in the journal might be taken to support revisionist interpretations that represent the maritime fur trade as a "political economy of violence" operating within a "culture of terror," their usefulness goes well beyond advancing one interpretive framework over another.[56] Lamb's and Herrick's thoughtful notations together provide a context for better appreciating the broader political and cultural theater within which the drama of the maritime fur trade occurred. Indeed, they illustrate just how complicated human relations were at that time and place, and they

[55] Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 281.

[56] Cole Harris, "Social Power and Cultural Change in Pre-Colonial British Columbia," *BC Studies*, no. 115/116 (Autumn/Winter 1997): 65.

thereby call into question the usefulness of trying to apply any overarching interpretive framework that would inevitably obscure more than it revealed.

APPENDIX: THE JOURNALS

The journals of David Lamb and Jacob Herrick provide critical insights into the way British and American traders as well as Nuu-chah-nulth indigenous people projected power during the Northwest Coast maritime fur trade of the late eighteenth century. To aid future scholars and to make these records accessible to indigenous people, we are providing the following transcriptions of the relevant portions of the journals as well a map where we locate the actions described therein.

The Journal of David Lamb

Monday July 30 [1792] At nine in the morning we got underway with a light wind from the South East and stood down the Bay, but at ten oclock it came on so thick & foggy that we could not see a Cables length from the Ship, therefore we dropt Anchor in ten fathoms water, near the North point of y^e^ Bay, but Capt: Baker got underway at the same time we did, and not withstanding the thickness of y^e^ w^r^ [weather] he proceeded on and got clear of y^e^ River, at Eleven the fogg clear'd up and we got underway again and stood out of y^e^ River, when we saw Capt: Baker lying to in the Ofng for us; at meridian we got clear of the River and stood to y^e^ North^d^ in company with y^e^ Jenny, and y^e^ remaining part of y^e^ Day we had very plea∫ant weather with y^e^ wind from y^e^ South^d^ & East^d^, ~~which continued~~. . .

August y^e^ 1st At six in the morning we saw Tatooches Island[57] bearing N.b.W. [North by West] eight Leagues distant, during the ~~whole of~~ day we had light variable winds, with thick foggy weather and a little Rain, which continued so untill y^e^ 3^d^ at eight in y^e^ Evening being a breast of Juan de Fucas' Straits we stood in for them, but the wind being light and variable, and very thick foggy weather, and Capt. Magee being in some measure doubtful of y^e^ pacic dispo∫ition of the Spaniards (towards American Vessels that should be found crui∫ing upon this Coast,) who had at this time a Settlement in y^e^ mouth of the ∫e Straits under y^e^ protection of an eight and twenty Gun Frigate commanded by Senior Fedalgo;[58] therefore he concluded it would be imprudent to run in without some real information con∫equently we proceed on to the Northward; during the time we were lying off y^e^ Entrance of y^e^ Straits we were visited by three Canoes from Tatooches I∫land with several Natives

[57] A small island off Cape Flattery, named after the Chief of the Classet (Makah) Indians who presided there.

[58] The Spanish established a fort on the Olympic Peninsula at Nunez Gaona (Neah Bay) between 28 May and 26 September 1792, to strengthen their claim to the Northwest Coast and to "check British moves in the straights." However, diplomatic developments with Britain as well as conflicts with local indigenous people forced the abandonment of the site. See Robert H. Ruby and John A. Brown, *Indians of the Pacific Northwest* (Norman, 1981), 4–5.

in y^m [them] but they Appeared not to po∫se∫s many Skins, neither incline to Barter what they had: this I∫land is Inhabited by a very large Tribe of Indians who∫e Chief is called Tatooch, a very stout muscular man, about thirty ve years of age and a famous warrior, his Conetions & Government are very near allied to Wickaninnish's as I before related in treating upon the Inhabitants of Port Cox;[59]

Aug. 2^d At nine in y^e morning y^e fogg clear'd away and we saw y^e Land bearing N.E.&NEbN. six legs [leagues] dist [distant] but it soon grew thick again and hid y^e Land from our sight, ~~wh~~it and remaind so till the ~~following~~ Evening of y^e third, when it broke away

[Aug] 3 again ~~and~~ so that we saw y^e mountains back of Port Cox bearing NNw. [North North West] dist 6 Leagues, and at the same time saw y^e Ship Jenny about four leagues to y^e south^d of us, we spent y^e following Night lying off and on, with an intention. of running into Port Cox y^e next morning, but

[Aug] 4 at daylight when we came to see the Land we found that we had drifted con∫iderable to y^e North and westward of y^e Entrance of y^e Harbour,[60] and y^e wind being very light, were obliged to out Boats and tow y^e Ship, and at noon y^e Entrance bore E.N.E. dist. 3 miles; at two in y^e afternoon we were vi∫ited by two Canoes in which were Wickaninnish and Tatoochatishes, the two principal Chiefs of y^e place;[61] Capt: Magee pre∫ented y^e former with a small sail for his Canoe[62] and to y^e latter he pre∫ented several trifing Articles which were very

[59] Captain John Meares of the *Felice Adventure* was the first to refer to the inner harbor of Clayoquot Sound as Port Cox. See John Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from China to the Northwest Coast of America* (1790; repr. New York, 1967). Unfortunately, this portion of Lamb's log has been lost or destroyed. We do know that Wickaninnish exerted some degree of political hegemony over many surrounding indigenous communities. He first rose to prominence in the late prehistoric or very early historic era when he moved his people out of the Kennedy Lake area into Clayoquot Sound. By the time Lamb visited the region, Wickaninnish was recognized as one of the most powerful leaders on the Pacific Northwest Coast, arguably more powerful than Chief Maquinna of Nootka Sound. For a general overview of Wickaninnish and his people see Valerie Sherer Mathes, "Wickaninnish, a Tla-o-qui-aht Chief, as Recorded by Early Travelers," in *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 70 (July 1979).

[60] The south entrance of Clayoquot Sound.

[61] Tatoochatishes (not to be confused with Tatoosh of the Makah) was Wickaninnish's younger brother. He is frequently mentioned in the diaries of Hoskins and Boit in F.W. Howay's *Voyages of the Columbia.* William Sturgis refers to two Tla-o-qui-aht Chiefs as Tatoochaetticus and Tatoochakeretl in his unpublished lectures. Both men were over six feet tall. One of these may have been the man Lamb refers to. Sturgis, second lecture, 5, unpublished lectures, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

[62] It is interesting that Magee traded a sail to Wickaninnish. While it is hardly a topic of hot debate, the issue of the origin of Northwest Coast sail technology remains unresolved. Howay has documented that Wickaninnish made frequent and concerted attempts to purchase sails for his canoes. See F.W. Howay, "The First Use of Sail by the Indians of the Northwest Coast," *The American Neptune* 1, no. 4 (1941). Interestingly, Howay notes that Franz Boas, the father of modern North American anthropology and one of the earliest academics to study Northwest Coast Natives, believed that indigenous people had sails prior to contact. There is an instance related in Bernard Magee's

gratefully accepted likewise we purcha∫ed one Cutsack made of y^e^ Sea Otter Skin;[63] at four we came to Anchor in y^e^ lower road in seven fathoms of water over a bottom of Sand, and at ve oclock ~~in y^e^ afternoon~~ a whale Boat came alongside with an Ofcer in her, belonging to a Ship about 300 Tons called y^e^ Butterworth [under] Capt: Brown from London on a trading voyage who was then lying in company with y^e^ Jenny in hannah's Harbour alittle to y^e^ northward and westward of port Cox,[64] the young Gent. informed us that Capt: Brown had been lying in Hannahs Harb^r^ several Days and had pre∫ented Wickananish with Articles of Trade to y^e^ value of sixty pounds sterling, but had not purchased nor received any Sea Otter Skins in return.

[See point #1 on Figure 1] August 5 at eight Oclock in y^e^ morning we hove up and towed the Ship up into y^e^ Harbour, & at ten came to Anchor in seven fathoms water over a Bottom of mud and Sand, the South point of y^e^ Entrance bearing S.E.bS. [South South East] the North point of the same, bearing SbE distant one mile; the Village Opit∫iter [Opitsit] Nwb.N. [North North West] One Mile and a half distant,[65] at Eleven [o-clock] two Whale Boats belonging to the Butterworth pa∫sed us, and went up the Eastern Branch of the Sound to a Village situated round a point of Land [See point #2 on Figure 1], which projected out from y^e^ Southern side of y^e^ same Branch,[66] and secluded the Village from Our sight which was about three Quarters of a mile distant from us; [See point #3 on Figure 1] about half an hour after the Boats pa∫sed us, we were alarmed by the Report of ten or twelve Muskets, at the Village where the Boats were gone which proved to be a Skirmish between the Boats and the Natives of y^e^ Village, a few Minutes after the discharge of the Mu∫kets we saw the two Boats come out from behind the point, and pull ~~acro~~ ∫ directly 'cro∫s the branch of the Sound to the north^d^ behind a Group of small I∫lands, and immediately we saw two Canoes well man'd and Arm'd with Mu∫kets

journal where Wickaninnish's desire for sails led him to strike an agreement with Captain Roberts of the *Jefferson*. The proposed deal entailed Wickaninnish purchasing the *Jefferson's* consort, the *Adventure*, for fifty prime otter pelts at the end of the season. However, due to the *Adventure* being wrecked off the mouth of the Columbia River, the transaction fell through. See Unpublished Magee Log.

[63] A sea otter garment resembling a robe typically worn by chiefs or other high-ranking indigenous leaders.

[64] Hanna's Harbour possibly refers to the area northwest of the village of Opitsit on Meares Island. Hanna was the name of the Chief of the Ahousaht Indians who resided on Flores Island. He received this name in a "name exchange" with Captain James Hanna of the ship *Sea Otter* or *Harmon*. See "Sea Otter Logbook," Sea Otter fonds, PR-1518, BC Archives, Victoria.

[65] Judging by Lamb's directions and the depth of the water, the *Margaret* seems to have been anchored just off the present day town of Tofino.

[66] These directions indicate the *Butterworth's* longboats may have been traveling to the Tla-o-qui-aht village of Ahkmahksis on southwestern Mearse Island. From these sources alone it is impossible to say which village was attacked, as the Tla-o-qui-ahts occupied numerous villages over the course of a year.



Figure 1. The *Butterworth's* route through Clayoquot Sound, 1792. Numbers correspond to specific points in the transcribed text of Lamb and Herrick's journals. Map by authors. Cartography by Jan Perrier Design.

Figure 2. British manufactured weapons similar to this ca.1800 cannon were among those traded to Chief Wickanninish during the maritime fur trade. This particular cannon was reportedly once mounted on the front of an ocean-going cedar canoe. Object ID 1980-90(A). Photo © the Powell River Historical Museum & Archives, British Columbia.

and Bayonets paddling acroſs in close purſuit of them ~~Boats~~[67] during the time the Boats were pulling round behind the ſe Iſlands which obſcur[d] them from Our sight, and deprived them ~~fr~~ of receiving any immediate protection from our Cannon, and the Natives in their Canoes kept up a continual re which gave us great anxiety fearing the Natives would intirely cut them off before it would be in our power to give them any Aſsistance,[68] but they soon came out from behind the Iſlands against the

[67] Assuming the tide was now running out, the crews of the long boats would have had no choice but to row behind Stone and Neilson Islands despite this route taking them precariously close to the village of Opitsit (Wickaninnish's primary residence). Had they chosen the more direct route between Arnet Island and the mainland the swift tides would have them swept down Duffin Passage into Templar Channel and out to the sea. We are grateful to Mr. Ken Gibson of Tofino for the assistance he provided the senior author in 1991 in helping clarify the locations of some of the events described in the journals. Mr. Gibson also provided us with an analysis of the tides in the region. In 1966 Mr. Gibson played a central role in re-discovering the site of Captain Gray's 1791–2 winter quarters at Adventure Cove, Meares Island.

[68] The fact that the *Butterworth's* longboats did not immediately turn to the *Margaret* for help says much about the state of affairs between the British and the Americans at that time. Likely, there were suspicions between the men of the past colonial overlord and those of the New Republic. This distrust, coupled with the danger of the tides left, few options to the longboat's crews. Likewise, as Lamb later points out, it appears Brown's men were specifically instructed to collect all the Tla-o-qui-aht pelts by whatever means in order to prevent Wickaninnish's people from trading with the

Village Opitsiter, when we perceived the Canoes were gaining very fast upon the Boats; therefore Capt: Magee order'd a six pound Cannon to be level'd and r'd directly between the Boats and Canoes to prevent the latter from perſuing the former, and it had the desired affect, for as soon as the Cannon was discharged the Natives desisted from pursuing the Boats, some paddled directly to the Shore, others lay too in their Canoe, but having our whale Boat & pinnace man'd and arm'd in readineſs to give further Aſsistance if neceſsary, Capt: Magee sent the formir with Mr Liscome[69] his second Ofcer in her, (who could speak the Language of the place very well) with Orders to pacify the Natives if poſsible and inquire into the cauſe of the present Diſturbance, and accordly he went along side of the Canoes, and was received by the Natives under Arms with their Muskets preſented and their Cartridge boxes girt'd about their waists in perfect readiness for to make a formidable defense, but Mr Liscome told them that he came to make peace, not to ght nor plunder them; conſequently they laid down their Arms, and conversed very freely with him, ~~upon abo~~ concern'g the disturbance that had taken place between them and Capt: Browns people.[70] They said that Capt: Browns whale boats had made a practice for several days past of plundering their Canoes and taking their Skins away by force, and they had now been to their Village upon the same buſiness, and had red upon it and killed two of their people, and wounded three,[71] consequently they returned the re upon the whale Boats, and purſued ym and in the Engagement had killed One man and wounded two, which we afterwards found to be true,[72] this is the Account the Ofcer gave when he returned on board. Capt: Baker the Gentleman who commanded the Jenny, which was then lying in Hannah's Harbour in company with Capt Brown, was on board of the Margaret during the whole Skirmish, and saw the whole proceedings, when he returned on board of his Veſsel; Capt Magee desired him to convey the following verbal Meſsage, to Capt: Brown (viz) if the Relation the Natives had given him concerning the preſent disturbance, which Capt: Baker would relate to him, was true and if he still proceeded in

Margaret and other vessels. It is unlikely that any of Brown's crew would have turned immediately to the *Margaret* for assistance.

[69] Otis Liscome was the *Margaret's* second mate. See the unpublished "Extracts from the Log of the Ship *Margaret* on the voyage to the N.W. Coast in 1792," Essex Institute, James Duncan Phillips Library, Salem, MA.

[70] Ingraham quotes Magee as telling him the Indians bared their breasts to Liscome shouting "Wuktahook poo—we are not afraid of guns." See Kaplanoff, *Joseph Ingraham's Journal*, 225.

[71] The Euro-American traders' primary motivation was profit. Instances of brutality were not uncommon, especially among those who did not intend to return the following year, or those who's trade goods had proven undesirable to the area's indigenous population. See Sturgis, first lecture, 18, unpublished lectures and Sturgis, third lecture, 1–12, unpublished lectures, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

[72] Brown later told Ingraham that one of his crew were killed and two seriously wounded. See Kaplanoff, *Joseph Ingraham's Journal*, 224.

plundering them, that he should not lend any further Aſsistance in protecting his boats, people, or property, as he had done. But Capt: Baker, as I was afterwards informd and very credibly too; Related the Meſsage and Capt: Magees proceedings intirely from the above, which caused some conſiderable disagreement between Capt: Brown and Capt: Magee.

According to what Information I could afterwd gain concerning the Skirmish between Capt: Browns people and the Natives, as above related, proceeded too much from Capt: Browns misconduct in his intercourſe with the Natives, for he was very much vexed after he had lavished so many valuable preſents upon them, that they would neither, preſent, nor trade with him at his propoſals, therefore two days before we went into Port Cox, he had sent frequently his boats with Orders to take the Skins from the Natives by force, and pay them what they should think propper, which was accordingly done several times before the Skirmish happened, and the cauſe of his sending his boats up to the Village immediately upon our coming in, was to plunder what Skins he could from them and for the future prevent them from trading with us,[73] but to their misfortune they now found the Natives in the greatest readineſs to defend their property even at the hazard of their lives, and proved very much to the disadvantage of Capt: Brown for he not only lost one of his best Seamen and had two more wounded, but likewise procured the Animoſity of the Natives agt [against] him ~~and~~ which prevent his having any further commerce with them.

THE JOURNAL OF JACOB W. HERRICK

1792 Augt. 5 In the afternoon the Ship was put in readineſs for making a Defence against the Natives providd they should in their present exasperated State attempt an attack upon us, and accordingly all Hands were kept to Quarters during the succeeding Night—

ye 6th. The next morning we saw yt the Butterworth Capt: Brown & the Jenny Capt: Baker had left the place the preceeding night— [See point# 6 on map] At eight Oclock a Canoe with three of the Natives in her came along side of us from Wickananish's Village with a Deer which they said Wickananish sent down as a present to Capt: Magee likewiſe returned a great Coat which Wickananish had borrowed two days before, and sent a Meſsage to Capt: Magee if he would send a Hostage up to the Village he would come down and trade with him, but several Circumſtances that happend in the Conversation with the three Men it evidently appeard that it was their desighn to get as many of us in their power as Capt: Brown had killed and wounded of their people, and conſequently would have mittigated their Exasperated Minds by Glutting their revengefull Appetites upon us, who were intirely innocent in the Diſturbance, therfore Capt: Magee thot: it not worth his while to court wickananish's friendship upon so hazardous terms, conſequently did

[73] We believe this is further reason for Brown's men not turning to the *Margaret* for assistance.

not send up any hostage and at 2 in the afternoon we unmoor'd Ship and dropt down with the tide into the lower Roads out of which we were oblidged to beat for the wind was from the Southward and Eastward, and at Six Oclock in the Evening we got clear of the Land and stood to the Northward and westward; during the Night we had light variable winds with thick close weather—

ye 7th. [See point #7 on map] At four Oclock in the [morning?] we saw a veſsel bearing west standg out of Nootka ſound at ve Oclock she r'd a Gun and hoisted American Colrs [colors] which we Anſwerd in the Same Manner, and bore away for her—at six Oclock we spoke with her and found her to be the Brig Hope Capt Joseph Ingraham from Boston, he immediately came on board and informed Capt: Magee that there was not the least danger in running into Nootka ſound, for he had been in, and was very civilly received and intertained by the Spaniards, and that there was every kind of Nourishment to be had that was neceſsary for him in his inrm Situation, therefore we bore away and stood in for the Sound in Company with the Hope, and at the same time we saw the Butterworth ahead of us standing in; at ten Oclock we came to Anchor in the Entrance of Friendly Cove, and saluted the Spanish Comandant with seven Guns, and he returned the Compliment with an Equal Number, at Eleven we hove up Our Anchor and warped further into the Cove, and mor'd Ship. At Twelve we viſited by Capt: Don Arrow the second in Command at this place to inquire into the Nature of our Voyage and examine the Ship Papers; we found lying at Anchor in this place a Spanish Brig called the Le Actif command'd by Capt: Don Arrow, the Doedalus Capt Nuse [New?] a Transport Ship from London layden with Stores for the Ship Diſcovery and Brig Chatham, who were now on this Coast upon Diſcovery and under the Direction of Capt: George Vancouver belonging to his Britannic Majesties royal Navy; The Butterworth Capt: Brown, and the Columbia Capt: Robert Grey; likewiſe the Hope came to Anchor in the Cove at the same time that we did.