"We Could Not Help Noticing the Fact That Many of Them Were Cross-Eyed": Historical Evidence and Coast Salish Leadership

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The past several years have seen an escalation in tensions over land and identity within and between Coast Salish communities in the adjacent coastal regions of Washington State and British Columbia. The highly publicized disputes between the Duwamish and Muckleshoot near Seattle; the Yale and Stó:lō in the Fraser River Canyon; and the Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh in the vicinity of Vancouver are only the most visible of these contestations. Although the immediate context for some of the discord can be found in the US Salish Tribes' efforts to secure recognition of federal treaty rights and the Canadian Salish First Nations' aspirations to secure modern treaties, the conflicts are at their heart competing visions over how collective identity is most appropriately defined and how political authority and leadership are most legitimately expressed. And in these disputes, legitimacy and appropriateness are adjudicated and assessed in relationship to history.

A host of social scientists have engaged in discussions over these matters, bringing a range of methodological and theoretical perspectives to bear on the Coast Salish past. But as Bruce Miller and Daniel Boxberger (two of the principal participants in these debates) observe, there is a "sometimes misleading assumption that anthropologists can easily deal with historical documents," and they point to the "valuable contribution that ethnohistorians and historians can make to the debate."[1] Interpreting this as an invitation, and recognizing the value in cross-disciplinary dialogue, I have chosen to engage the discussion less with reference to anthropological models than with a focused eye on the use and potential application of historical evidence in the construction and deconstruction of what is variously referred to as "traditional" or "pre-contact" or "Aboriginal" Coast Salish chiefly authority.

In particular, in concert with Miller and Boxberger and the more recent contributions by archaeologists Bill Angelbeck and Eric McLay,[2] I am seeking to assess both historical developments and historical narratives (written and oral) on their own terms. I am trying to further resituate the debate away from a discussion that mobilizes historical evidence in support of anthropological interpretation (and vice versa) towards one that recognizes not only the different ways in which classic ethnographers and historical personages created observations of the Coast Salish people, but also the way in which anthropologists and historians have used such information to create differing and often seemingly contradictory interpretations of the ethnographic and temporal "other." That is to say, a study of Coast Salish leadership holds the potential to reveal, and possibly reconcile, the still exaggerated opposition in the disciplines of history and anthropology between structure and event and between deductive and inductive reasoning.

Even as structuralism has fallen from academic favour, anthropologists still recognize the value of paying attention to the social structures that underpin society and that give culture meaning and coherence. Historians likewise, despite the rise of social history and postmodern theorizing, continue to demonstrate a predilection for events and the associated issue of change over time. Thus, as Marshall Sahlins has repeatedly elucidated, for too many anthropologists and historians "it seemed that 'event' and 'structure' could not occupy the same epistemological space. The event was conceived as antistructural, the structure as nullifying the event."[3] Whereas history was all dates, events, and the exploits of big men, with an emphasis on discerning change over time, anthropology was anonymous and principally interested in documenting those core features of society that remained stable over the passage of time. And yet, as Ray Fogelson has cogently argued, events (such as sudden disease-induced population decline) "dramatically affect social organizations, the perception of traditions, religious conversion, revitalization movements, and a host of other domains."[4]

Understanding the history of Indigenous peoples requires us to bring structure and event into dialogue with one another so we can assess the degree to which structure might sometimes accommodate and subsume an event, or conversely, the extent to which an event is occasionally so unprecedented and momentous that it causes structures to bend and change under its weight. We can do this, as Sahlins suggests, by inverting our theoretical praxis and recognizing that historical events can become ethnographically intelligible through the study of change

rather than stasis. That is to say, instead of looking for continuity in change we need to be alert to instances of change in continuity.[5]

The Debate

The generally accepted ethnographic view of "pre-contact" or "traditional" Coast Salish society, as Wayne Suttles has pointed out, was that "there existed no political authority beyond the level of the village, [and] some have even denied the existence of village chiefs, seeing households as the largest autonomous unit." This model does not deny inter-village linkages and the power of kith and corporate-kin group ties built upon modes of economic exchange;[6] rather it asserts that such associations were characterized by "ties of marriage, exchange between affines, sharing of access to resources, and potlatching."[7] This orthodoxy faced a provocative challenge from the writings of Kenneth Tollefson in 1987 and 1989 when he applied evolutionary models to interpret historical evidence. Tollefson argued that prior to contact, the Puget Sound Salish had been organized into regional "Chiefdoms" and formal political confederacies.[8] Suttles and others, in Tollefson's view, had overemphasized social networks at the expense of real political bonds, and as such were just as incorrect as the earlier generation of ethnographers who had failed to see any meaningful connections between geographically isolated settlements. According to Tollefson, the problem was essentially historical and stemmed from the ethnographers' excessive reliance on twentieth-century informants and their associated ignoring of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historical documents. The society that Suttles and others were describing was not traditional, Tollefson posited, but rather the remnants of an earlier, more sophisticated culture that had suffered contact-induced "defeat and forced removal." Historical evidence, on the other hand, allegedly documented strong centralized leadership from the era "before [Native] defeat and depopulation."[9]

Initially Tollefson's revisionist thesis seemed to gain traction among academics. It was picked up for inclusion in a prominent anthropology undergraduate survey textbook and also used as corroborative evidence by an archaeologist engaged in a similar debate in Southern California.[10] But in the end, it generally failed to shift the views of regional specialists. Eventually even Tollefson acknowledged that his conclusions were largely only applicable to one particular Coast Salish tribal community (the Snoqualmie near Seattle) and, even then,

only at a particular historical moment (during the chieftainship of Pat Kanim in the 1850s), which was at least seventy years after first European contact[11] – but still sufficiently early for the Snoqualmie to argue that they met the criteria established by the US government to qualify for federal recognition as a "tribe" and therefore receive funding and political recognition.[12] This contemporary political context demonstrates vividly the highly politicized nature of discussions over historical expressions of Coast Salish collective identity.

While something of a scholarly consensus has re-emerged around the idea that Coast Salish people forged and maintained meaningful cross-tribal regional social networks prior to contact, not everyone has accepted the idea that these networks were principally material and ecological (i.e., not political) in nature. Jay Miller, in particular, argued that all of the more recent economic and political models of traditional Coast Salish society were fundamentally "flawed by misconceptions that wrongly emphasize Eurocentric stereotypes about personal individuality instead of situating families within their anchoring landscape." He sought to "return to basics" by bringing a more Indigenous epistemology to the debate and by rejecting what he regarded as a tendency within the established literature towards "overly democratizing a strong elite" through approaches that were "woefully irreligious."[13]

Suttles, of course, had earlier recognized and acknowledged the significance of non-material-based collective units derived from "participation in the yearly round of subsistence activities and periodic ceremonial activities." In particular, he had identified the centrality of such non-economic and non-political collectives as the inter-village communities of winter dancers – which at the time of Suttles's writing in the early 1960s were experiencing a renaissance.[14] Presumably, the fraternity of masked sx̲wó:oxeye dancers, and even the community of distinct spirit entities that Coast Salish shaman still describe as existing within every Coast Salish individual, also fell within this category. For as Suttles notes, none of these metaphysical communities was "necessarily identical with the residential units or the kin groups, some of them necessarily differing from them."[15] Bruce Miller and Boxberger likewise acknowledged that at certain times spiritual communities took situational precedence over the affinal ties forged through materialistic concerns. But for Jay Miller the spiritual networks, and in particular the radiating shamanic identification, were the most meaningful and consistently operationalized collective identities cutting across anchored watershed-based tribal communities.[16]

More recently, Stó:lō Nation's staff archaeologist, David Schaepe, has invited us to turn our attention to the unique geographic and archaeological features found in certain parts of Coast Salish territory for what they reveal about particular expressions of authority and collective identity. Schaepe shows how a previously unknown (to Western outsiders) network of massive rock walls linking immediate pre-contact-era settlements in the Fraser River Canyon demonstrates a profound degree of multi-village social and political cooperation most likely built upon the foundations of the corporate family group structure.[17] Schaepe's archaeological analysis, supported by Salish oral histories, also posits that construction of these walls and their coordinated use as defensive features during attacks suggest that centralized political leadership characterized that particular region for a period of time – perhaps similar to what Tollefson described for the Snoqualmie in the 1950s.

Most recently still, in 2011, Bill Angelbeck and Eric McLay have contributed to the discussion by analysing twenty-one separate oral accounts of what is arguably the single greatest instance of coordinated Coast Salish collective identity in the nineteenth century: the ca. 1830–55 multi-tribal Salish alliance that presented a united military force against the raiding southern Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw Lekwiltok in what is today known as the Battle of Maple Bay. They conclude that the more than 1,000 warriors from roughly 50 Coast Salish communities who participated in the coordinated military exercise did so without any overarching political authority coordinating and directing their activities. The battle, they argue, therefore provides "a historical example of how a network form of cooperative political organization became regionally mobilized … It illustrates … how autonomous households mobilized networks of kin and other allies throughout the Coast Salish region … to reveal that the scale of political cooperation was locally based, context dependent, and provisional."[18]

In the light of the still-unfolding nature of this debate, and the ongoing political tensions within and among contemporary Coast Salish communities, this paper is primarily interested in assessing whether introduced events have modified Coast Salish social structures (in a manner similar to either the geographic specificity Schaepe examines in the Fraser River Canyon or the temporal specificity described by Boxberger and Bruce Miller and by Tollefson for parts of Puget Sound) and, if so, determining the extent to which underlying social structures have informed the way such historical events were understood and

responded to. In other words, were certain historical events so profoundly disruptive that they caused significant change in Coast Salish social structures – and in particular changes in Coast Salish systems of leadership? And if so, did they cause expressions of political authority within Salish territory to become more centralized or less centralized over time; if such change existed did it result in unidirectional change or perhaps some other more fluid expression of political authority?

The Earliest European Observers

An inductive approach to historical understanding necessarily starts with the earliest extant records. And indeed, much of the debate to date has revolved around determining which non-Indigenous observers were on site sufficiently early to observe traditional Coast Salish society. Tollefson, in particular, came under attack for suggesting that the American settlers of the early 1850s were on the scene before any significant contact-induced transformations in Coast Salish social structures had occurred. His detractors argued, quite correctly, that the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) had been in contact with the Coast Salish for a generation prior to the Americans' arrival and, more to the point, had left records that "contain daily entries on the activities of the native people."[19] More important still, as Suttles pointed out, the Spanish had visited Salish territory even earlier. Indeed, Tollefson's assertions helped to inspire Suttles to conduct a review of the English translations of the Spanish records for their ethnographic observations. In the end, Suttles interpreted the Spanish documents as supporting his decentralized interpretation of Coast Salish authority, arguing that they provided "a loadstone showing that in this instance we are, after all, headed in the right direction."[20]

Certain vagaries and inconsistencies, however, exist within the early British and Spanish documentary sources that require comment. To take the Spanish records first, most English-language scholars interested in the Spaniards' observations have relied on Henry Wagner's widely accessible 1933 translations of the 1790s Spanish sources. Suttles uses Wagner to conclude that "on the matter of chiefly authority, the accounts of Quimper, Pantoja, and Cardero offer no support for any revisions of our views."[21] Indeed, Suttles titles his article after Manuel Quimper's observation that the First Nations of the Strait of Juan de Fuca "recognize no superior chief." From this reference and an absence of descriptions of centralized political leadership, it is easy to

understand why Suttles would infer that the Coast Salish did not have regional leaders who controlled multiple villages comparable to the nearby Nuu-chah-nulth leader Wickaninnish at Clayoquot or Tatooch at Cape Flattery. While this is a reasonable interpretation of Quimper as presented by Wagner, it is not necessarily the only one. In addition, what Quimper did *not* report was not necessarily absent.

On the subject of meaning, Wagner's translation twice uses the expression "they recognize no superior chief" in relation to Coast Salish people. However, in one instance the reference appears in a paragraph in which Quimper is writing about both Salish and the Nuu-chah-nulth Dididat under the leadership of a man referred to as Janapé. It is possible to read the excerpt, therefore, as Suttles did – as implying that Quimper meant that this one particular Coast Salish community simply did not recognize Janapé the Dididat chief as their superior. The second time Quimper uses the expression is in describing the people of Bahia de Quimper (Port Discovery). In this instance, it is useful to quote the sentence in full: "They recognize no superior chief and carry on continual warfare with those on the north side [of the Strait of Juan de Fuca], thus accounting for the fact that the beaches are strewn with the harpooned heads of their enemies." From this sentence, one could infer that by stating that they recognized no superior chief, Quimper was reflecting the people of Port Discovery's contention that they themselves were the hegemonic power, that they were not subordinate to their northern neighbours. By way of comparison, had Quimper described Wickaninnish of Clayoquot (a man well known to have been a political powerhouse and regional leader), it is likely he would have concluded that Wickaninnish also did not recognize any superior chiefs, he being *the* hegemonic power.

But beyond these matters, in interpreting Quimper's statements, the issue of translation becomes crucial. Wagner (who incorporated into his published translation large portions of text from an unpublished 1911 translation done by G.F. Barwick and then relied on a team of graduate student research assistants to translate other sections of the documents) is notorious for inconsistencies. The extent of the inaccuracies becomes evident when one compares his translation with an independent one published three years earlier by Cecil Jane.[22] On one occasion, Wagner translates Pantoja's description of a group of Salish people from Georgia Strait in the following terms:

> We found *no notable difference* between their physiognomy and those of the other natives who had visited us in the strait. On the other hand, however,

> we could not help noticing the fact that *many of them were cross-eyed*, that they wore their mustaches short, and tufts of hair on their chins and their eyebrows were rather thick. Their clothes were reduced in general to coarse and well-woven blankets fastened by two pins on the shoulder, but only long enough to reach the knees. An occasional one wore a *deerskin*. What covered the man who appeared to be chief, merited special attention as he wore *a woolen blanket on top of these*, a hat in the *form of a truncated cone*, five *brass* bracelets on the right wrist, and a hoop of copper round his neck … Later on two canoes appeared, and arrested our attention by the *evil appearance* of the four Indians who came in them, for they were *all cross-eyed* and of very disagreeable countenances.[23]

Compare this with Jane's translation of the same entry:

> We found *a noticeable difference* between their appearance and that of the other natives whom we had seen in the strait, but that which made the greatest impression on us was the fact that *many of them were blind in one eye, which was covered with a short skin.* They had pointed beards and very bushy eyebrows. Their clothes were generally no more than a cloak of rough wool and well woven, joined by two clasps at the shoulders and not hanging down below the knees. Here and there one was wearing a *skin*, that of the man who seemed to be the chief meriting special attention; he *wore under it another cloak of fine wool*, a hat with *an ornament like a shortened cone*, five *tin* bracelets on the right wrist, and one of copper around his neck … There afterwards appeared at the anchorage two canoes which attracted our attention on account of the *hideous appearance* of the four Indians who were with them; *they were all pimply* and presented a most unpleasant sight.[24]

From Wagner we are presented with a description of Coast Salish people who were apparently the same as the Nuu-chah-nulth of Juan de Fuca Strait, who were strangely cross-eyed, and of evil countenance. Through Jane we are told the opposite, that these people were quite different from their Nootkan neighbours, most noticeably (and I will return to this issue) because they demonstrated characteristic signs of having suffered from smallpox.[25] Unfortunately, my Spanish is inadequate to allow me to assess the relative accuracy of the two translations vis-à-vis the original. However, at my request, a bilingual Spanish colleague, Luisa Munoz,[26] examined both translations in relation to the original handwritten Spanish and concluded that Jane was the more careful scholar.[27]

Lamentably for the purpose at hand, Jane translated only Quimper's journal and not Panjota's, so we cannot read a comparative published account of the alleged assertion that the Coast Salish "recognize no superior chief." However, upon scrutinizing a microfilm copy of Panjota's handwritten original, my colleague Munoz has determined that once again Wagner's translation left something to be desired. Pantoja's actual words are "El idioma de estos naturales varia mucho con el de los de fuera, no conocieron Superior. Estan en continua guerra con los del Norte por cuya razon tienen … en sus playas cabezas de arponadas de sus enemigos." Munoz translates these as "The language of these naturals [Indigenous people] differs greatly from those on the outside [of the Straight of Juan de Fuca]. They, (the community) recognize none as superior, always being at war with those on the north side, which explains why the beaches are strewn with the heads of their enemies on poles." In other words, "superior" in this case may well refer to groups and not individuals, in which case what the Spanish appears to have meant is that the Coast Salish community at Port Discovery did not recognize the Nuu-chah-nulth tribes on the outside of the Strait of Juan de Fuca as their superiors.

Likewise, the second of Panjota's references to Coast Salish people allegedly recognizing no superior chiefs reads, "Acercandos el numero de naturales a 500, no conocieron superior," which Munoz translates as "The number of naturals [in this particular community] amounts to about five hundred. They do not recognize (other people or tribes) as superior." In the letter accompanying her translation, Munoz explains that in this sentence, the reference to not recognizing superiors appears to refer *not* to people within a village or community who did not recognize a given individual as their superior or chief, but rather to the people from one village considering themselves, and their leader, as superior to the people and leader from a neighbouring community: "As I understand it, they considered themselves the best tribe."[28]

Plainly, the Spanish records, especially as presented by Wagner, have limitations as tools for ethnographic reconstruction. And where they do provide relevant information, it can just as reasonably be read as challenging the traditional decentralized view of the Coast Salish people organized only at the family or village level as it can the opposite.

If the Spanish records are frustratingly confused and ambiguous, what are we to make of the subsequent fur trade documents? They raise at least two important questions: What, if anything, they can tell us about Coast Salish political structures, and in what context should the records be read in order to make them ethnographically meaningfully?

Regarding the issue of context, it is essential to note that after the initial Spanish and British explorations of the early 1790s (which are discussed in more detail later), the Puget Sound–Georgia Strait region was essentially ignored by Europeans until the mid-1820s. Complementary records suggest that perhaps a few Boston-based maritime fur traders sporadically visited the area in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but these visitors apparently did not leave a record of their observations, nor do we know what impact their visits (if they indeed occurred) might have had. Thus, the earliest surviving detailed nineteenth-century European descriptions of Coast Salish people are those associated with Northwest trader Simon Fraser's 1808 exploration of the river that now bears his name, and those generated by James MacMillan during his 1824 exploration expedition up Puget Sound and into the lower Fraser Valley/delta on behalf of the HBC. Fraser, as well as two of MacMillan's clerks, John Work and François Annance, kept daily journals of their observations and experiences, and each of these has been preserved. Shortly thereafter, in 1827, Fort Langley was established on the lower Fraser River. Fort Nisqually was next built on the southern edge of Puget Sound in 1833. Incomplete journals from both these posts survive.

Historical scholarship on the early relations between Indigenous people and newcomers on the Northwest Coast has fit uncomfortably with the dominant narratives established by historians for the rest of North America. This is in large part because the chronology of interactions occurs so much later than in eastern and central North America, and because of the somewhat autonomous political developments of both the Indigenous people and the subsequent Pacific Slope colonial regimes. In his seminal survey *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, for example, historian J.R. Miller has argued that the history of Native-newcomer relations in Canada can be understood within a paradigm that shifted from "cooperation, to coercion, to confrontation."[29] A similar model has been established for the United States in the writings of historians such as James Axtell.[30] But on the Pacific Coast, historians have instead followed a now well-worn path that was at first preoccupied with assessing the merits of the "enrichment thesis" (i.e., did the fur trade result in a flourishing of First Nations art and culture, or did it lead to the degeneration and exploitation of Indigenous people?), then with determining when contact-era cooperation turned into conflict, and finally when conflict-era "resistance" turned into "renewal."[31]

Among the most inspirational of the recent works are Cole Harris's *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and*

Geographical Change, Alexandra Harman's *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities Around Puget Sound*, and Lissa Wadewitz's *The Nature of Borders: Salmon and Boundaries in the Salish Sea*, which all argue that the theatre of power within which the fur trade and early settlement occurred was more complex and violent than previously appreciated. Informed by postcolonial theorizing, works such as these argue that European cultural imperialism was more subtle and multifaceted than previously conceived, but that Indigenous people were not without their own sources of competing power.[32] More directly relevant for the question at hand, perhaps, are studies of more easterly Indigenous groups of an earlier era. Extrapolating from the writings of Arthur J. Ray and others, one might conclude that those Coast Salish leaders living near European posts or trade centres may have taken advantage of the wealth and material advantage created by their position as middlemen in the trade to increase their authority and influence vis-à-vis their neighbours.[33] Analysis of changes in slave raiding among more northern and southern coastal communities resulting from the fur trade hints at the kinds of sociocultural impact of the fur trade among all Northwest Coast people.[34] But a review of relevant fur trade documentation creates an ambiguous image of Coast Salish leadership and political authority.

Simon Fraser arrived among the central Coast Salish in June 1808 after travelling down the river that now bears his name. Nearing the ocean, Fraser identified a single leader from a village near present-day Langley whom he described as exercising great influence over many people from various neighbouring communities. Fraser consistently referred to this person as "the Chief" and on one occasion explained how this leader "made us understand that he was the greatest of his nation and equal in power to the sun."[35] In another entry, relying on assistance from his upriver translator, Fraser described this particular leader as "the Chief of the Ackinroe"[36] – Ackinroe being the English corruption of the Nlakapamux/Thompson expression "*s?ecnkwu/Se'á:tchenkō*," which they used to describe all the mainland Coast Salish Halq'emeylem speakers (and which Matilda Gutierrez of Chawathil explained was a pejorative term that implied that the Stó:lō were the grandchildren of Nlakapamux slaves).[37]

The alleged regional leader described in Fraser's journal lived in a series of connected longhouses that stretched for 640 feet (195 metres – or longer than six NHL hockey rinks). The chief's individual living quarters were distinguished from those of other family leaders by its size, at 5,400

square feet (501 square metres – or just under one-third the size of an NHL hockey rink) compared to 3,600 square feet (334 square metres) for the others. Upon Fraser's arrival, the chief invited him into his home and "entertained" the Europeans with "songs and dances of various descriptions."[38] According to Fraser, this man's leadership role was acknowledged by others throughout the ceremonies, for he stood "in the center of the dance or ring giving instructions, while others were beating the drum against the walls of the house."[39]

Social leadership and social space, of course, does not necessarily translate into political authority. But further indication of the extent of this leader's authority is suggested in his ability to direct the activities of a large number of people from multiple settlements. This became particularly clear when Fraser's welcome wore out and he was pursued back up the Fraser River by an increasingly large and hostile group of local Coast Salish – all led by "the Chief of the Ackinroe." In terms of specifics, Fraser even records that the chief successfully commanded several hundred people from a variety of villages to "drop behind" as they participated in the chase.[40] Following this demonstration of his authority, the now openly antagonistic Ackinroe chief and his followers shadowed Fraser's party all the way from a location near present-day Langley/Matsqui to a site beyond the modern town of Hope (a distance of over 100 kilometres). At each village where Fraser had been warmly received on his downward journey, he found that the Ackinroe leader was able to quickly turn the people against him. Fraser describes the way his nemesis accomplished this: "Still bent on mischief, the leader at landing began to testify his hostile disposition by brandishing his horn club, and by making a violent harangue to the people of the village, who already seemed to be in his favour."

While the evidence is insufficient to allow one to draw direct parallels between the levels of authority exercised by Fraser's Ackinroe chief and the Snoqualmie leader Pat Kanim of southern Puget Sound as described by Tollefson, or the multi-village leaders implied by the integrated Fraser Canyon rock walls studied by Schaepe, enough similarity does exist to warrant cautious comparison. Clearly, the Ackinroe chief not only thought of himself as a powerful leader, but he was able to demonstrate a degree authority throughout the entire lower Fraser watershed. What then does this mean for the standard interpretations of non-centralized leadership and political authority? For while it might be possible to explain the behaviour and apparent influence of Fraser's Ackinroe chief within a standard ethnographic understanding

of status and kin ties among neighbouring communities, it appears that his degree of authority exceeded what would typically be attributed to a Coast Salish family or even village leader. Whether it was somehow institutionalized or rather a product of his personality in a particular historical context is impossible to tell.

In their respective journals from the 1820s, the immediate successors to Fraser in Coast Salish exploration, John Work and François Annance, consistently refer to Indigenous "Nations" and "tribes" (i.e., the "Nisqually Nation," the "Sanahomis tribe," the "Scaadchet tribe," the "Cahoutetts Nation," etc.). What they meant by "Nation" and "Tribe" is never entirely apparent. Aside from recognizing that the terms should not be correlated casually with those found in introductory anthropology textbooks from the mid-twentieth century, a careful contextualization of these modifiers is essential before attempting any interpretation. For instance, was there a standard early-nineteenth-century fur trader's notion of what nation and tribe meant? Did their use of such expressions reflect Indigenous realities, or were they indicative of what a Scotsman and a French Canadian explorer expected to see?[41] The fact that the journals describe clusters of villages as having a sense of collective identity suggests some sort of extra-village organization, but what form this took, and whether it was inconsistent with standard understandings of traditional culture – especially along the lines of that defined by Jay Miller – is unclear. Likewise, on the matter of leadership, fur traders John Work and François Annance both refer to certain men as "chief of this tribe" and others as "the principle chief of the tribe." Among certain tribes and nations, they also identify "a second chief," etc. Yet, contrary to what Fraser described in the same region sixteen years earlier, none of their alleged chiefs is shown to have any authority over people of other villages. Moreover, their identification of "3 or 4 chiefs" from a single village seems consistent with the standard decentralized ethnographic descriptions of apolitical household leaders related by blood and marriage but holding no real political authority.[42]

The existing *Fort Nisqually Journal* commences nine years after Work and Annance's expedition and thirteen years before the United States acquired unilateral sovereignty over the Puget Sound region. It provides detailed documentation for the years 1833 to 1859. Within the journal there are no explicit references to leaders with influence over broad geographical areas, but neither are there descriptions explicitly indicative of the contrary. The journal does describe leaders, or "chiefs," some of whom are clearly more influential than others. Frequent mention is

made of "the" chief of such-and-such community (e.g., "Watskatch the Sannahomish chief") while on other occasions there are references to "a" chief of a particular community (e.g., "a Soquamish Chief") indicating the existence of more than one recognized leader. But references to "the" chief do not necessarily imply central leadership and authority. Rather, the designation often seems to simply refer to "a" previously mentioned chief. The degree of authority is never described explicitly; nowhere in the *Nisqually Journal* does the author attempt to explain Indigenous social structures or authority patterns. Again, the identification of people from multi-village "tribes" seems to indicate the existence of broad regional concepts of shared identity, but the many references to different leaders and the lack of mention of any single regional leader suggest non-centralized leadership.[43]

To place the Nisqually observations within a broader historical context, it should be noted that frequent entries describe Indigenous activities that appear related to the early-nineteenth-century prophet dance phenomenon.[44] In the 1830s, Coast Salish society was in a state of great social fluidity as people sought to accommodate new ceremonial expressions and prophetic teachings. We know that prophets were emerging in several areas of Coast Salish territory and introducing radical new ideas into Salish society. Some, as Suttles has documented, encouraged women to select their own spouses, thus undermining hereditary and hierarchical familial control while promoting gender autonomy and the diminishing of class divisions. Some of the prophets went on to consolidate significant political control (as in the upper Skagit watershed) while others seem to have confined their influence to social realms (middle and upper Fraser region). Several of the prophets professed divinely inspired knowledge of European religion, economy, and governance.[45] Certainly some family leaders opposed the prophetic teachings, while others no doubt worked to co-opt the movement and capitalize on the popularity and charisma of the prophets. Not only does the impact of the prophets need to be considered in any discussion of the historical expressions of Coast Salish political authority, but so too does whatever context it was that created the circumstances giving rise to the prophet movement – glimpses of which are found in the fur trade records.

While neither Fraser, Work and Annance, nor the keeper of the Nisqually journal ever attempt to describe the Coast Salish social structures,[46] in 1838, HBC chief factor James Douglas did provide what is possibly the closest thing we have to a fur-trade-era ethnographic

description of the Puget Sound Coast Salish. Without defining or distinguishing among terms, Douglas described multi-village "communities" and "societies" (their names generally corresponding with Work's and Annance's "nations" and "tribes") occupying watersheds or islands. Collectively, all the Puget Sound Salish are described as "without a doubt … one and the same people, deriving a local designation from their place of residence." Community or society "appellations" (such as Squaly amish, Puce alap amish, Sino amish, Sina homish, Skatchet, and Nowhalimeek)

> were regarded as the source of an imaginary line of demarcation, which divides the inhabitants of one petty stream, from the people living upon another, and have become the fruitful source of the intensive commotions, that so frequently disturb the tranquillity of the District. In fact, no national distinctions whether of character, of manners, of language or even diversity of interest could increase the animosity now existing between these branches of the same great tribe. The consequence of this state of mutual hostility is, a feeling of general distrust. Members of the distant communities cannot visit the Fort without endangering their personal safety, and therefore seldom make the attempt.[47]

It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from Douglas's descriptions. However, such observations are significant, for if, as Bruce Miller and Boxberger suggest, subsequent American documentation indicates that broader political entities and shared identities did not exist immediately prior to their creation by government officials during the Washington Territory treaty process in the mid-1850s, then something else in the preceding generation apparently caused a degree of decentralization: perhaps new leaders arising from the prophesy movement? Such an assumption is consistent with Jay Miller's thesis but also indicative of the importance of understanding introduced change alongside Indigenous response and agency.

Inter-community Hostility

Participants in the debate accept that Tollefson's description of Pat Kanim's political authority may be accurate, but they interpret it as resulting from the uniquely post-contact military necessity for collective security arising from nineteenth-century Lekwiltok (southern Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw) raiding. Indeed, while Suttles sees "warfare as

mainly another means of acquiring wealth, which was integral to the potlatch,"[48] he nonetheless explicitly links chiefly authority with conflict as expressed in the need for collective action against a common enemy – most significantly the Lekwiltok.[49] Bruce Miller and Boxberger likewise defer to Suttles's assertion that an absence of Spanish references to fortification is "evidence that in the 1790's Lekwiltok raiding into southern Central Coast Salish territory had not yet begun."[50] The evidence, however, is sufficiently murky that such firm conclusions are difficult to support.

Jay Miller criticizes Tollefson's description of Pat Kanim as being overly concerned with specific historical events and occurrences. For him, a better way to understand the Snoqualmie leader is to recognize that when faced with an external threat, traditional Coast Salish society was flexible enough to adapt enhanced features of centralized authority without those features becoming non-Indigenous in character. Nor did they necessarily have to become long-lasting or permanent. Yet, without a temporally sensitive context within which to appreciate instances of more centralized leadership, it is impossible to answer fundamental questions such as under what circumstances did centralized Coast Salish leadership occur, and were such factors strictly post-contact in nature? For this reason, it is important to determine whether the lack of Spanish references to Indigenous fortifications can actually be taken to mean that such fortifications did not exist, and if by extension, therefore, Lekwiltok raiding had not yet occurred, precipitating the need for centralized collective leadership.

Journals associated with Captain George Vancouver's voyages of 1791 to 1795 describe a specially designed, though recently abandoned, defensive village on the northern extreme of Salish territory, in southern Desolation Sound, near the Lekwiltok/Coast Salish border. This structure, known informally today among members of the Sliammon community as "Flea Village" due to the description in the British journals of numerous fleas living in the abandoned remains, seems to have functioned like a Salish Masada vis-à-vis the Lekwiltok:

> That [this region of Salish territory too] had been more populous than at present, was manifest by the party having discovered an extensive deserted village, computed to have been the residence of nearly three hundred persons. It was built on a rock, whose perpendicular cliffs were nearly inaccessible on every side; and connected with the main, by a low narrow neck of land, about the centre of which grew a tree, from whose

> branches planks were laid to the rock, forming by this means a communication that could easily be removed, to prevent their being molested by their internal unfriendly neighbours; and protected in front, which was presented to the sea, from their external enemies, by a platform, which, with much labour and ingenuity had been constructed on a level with their houses, and overhung and guarded the rock. This, with great stability, was formed by large timbers judiciously placed for supporting each other in every direction; their lower ends were well secured in the chasms of the rocks about half way to the water's edge, admitting the platform to be so projected as to command the foot of the rock against any attempt to storm the village. The whole seemed so skillfully contrived, and so firmly and well executed, as rendered it difficult to be considered the work of the untutored tribes we had been accustomed to meet [in Georgia Strait and Puget Sound]; had not their broken arms and implements, with parts of their manufactured garments, plainly evinced its habitants to be of the same race.[51]

In addition, upon reaching the edge of Georgia Strait in 1808, Simon Fraser described what may have been a fortified village at Musqueam:

> Here we landed and found but a few old men and women; the others fled into the woods upon our approach. The fort is 1500 feet [457 metres] in length and 90 feet [27 metres] in breadth. The houses, which are constructed as those mentioned in other places, are in rows; besides some that are detached. One of the natives conducted us through all the apartments, and then desired us to go away, as otherwise the Indians would attack us.[52]

It could be argued that what Fraser interpreted as a "fort" was simply a series of connected Musqueam longhouses. In support of this position, anthropologist Mike Kew observes that Musqueam oral traditions make no reference to a fortified village, and had the village been fortified, it is unlikely Fraser's arrival would have caused people to flee to the forest.[53] These arguments are compelling. But on the other hand, Fraser was a fur trader who lived much of his life behind palisaded fort walls. As such, he knew what a fort was, and judging by other references in his journal, he was able to distinguish longhouses from fortifications. In his journal Fraser describes only two Salish villages as having been fortified. In addition to the structure at Musqueam, he described the Lilloet settlement in the upper Fraser Canyon in these terms:

> The village is a fortification of 100 by 24 feet surrounded with palisades eighteen feet high, slanting inwards, and lined with a shorter row that supports a shade [shelter], covered with bark, and which are dwellings. This place we understand is the metropolis of the Askettih [Lilloet] Nation.[54]

Placed in the context of this earlier description, I infer that what Fraser described at Musqueam was indeed a palisaded fort. His description of the Musqueam structure distinguishes between "the fort" and "the houses," the latter of which he describes as "constructed as those mentioned in other places." From this one might conclude that the sixty-foot-wide Musqueam longhouses were protected behind a ninety-foot-wide palisade. But again, such opaque descriptions highlight the inherent problems of drawing firm ethnographic conclusions from such historical evidence.

Other historical records, albeit from a somewhat later period, describe fortified Salish villages that are not inconsistent with Fraser's cryptic description. For example, in 1841 Charles Wilks described a village on the north shore of Whidby Island where longhouses were protected behind a giant palisaded wall. This wall was constructed of thirty-foot-tall (nine-metre-tall) plank pickets, which were firmly fixed into the ground, the space between them being sufficient to allow only a musket to point through. Wilks explains that fortifications of this sort reached 400 feet (122 metres) in length, within which the longhouses were situated.[55] In 1844, accompanying James Douglas on his voyage to establish Fort Victoria on the southern tip of Vancouver Island, the Reverend J.B.Z. Bolduc described a "little fortress" in Esquimalt Harbour formed by stakes planted in the ground.[56] Paul Kane likewise described a Clallam village that was protected behind a double row of strong pickets, the outer palisade being twenty feet high, and the second about five feet.[57] A.C. Anderson, another veteran of the fur trade, explained that in the 1840s, palisaded villages were common along the lower Fraser River. He describes the Kwantlen (from around the present site of Langley) as being so afraid of the Vancouver Island Cowichan that they "rarely venture to [the river's] mouth, and that Palisaded villages and other precautions against surprise show that even at home a ceaseless dread prevails." Anderson describes the uppermost Coast Salish village in the lower Fraser Canyon as "a palisaded fort," and he records that as soon as the fishing season ended, the local Coast Salish "retreated to their palisaded dwellings below."[58] Likewise, in the spring of 1858, Gibbs observed a fortified village at the junction

of the Sumas and Fraser Rivers in the Fraser Valley.[59] But if these references largely coincide with the arrival of Europeans (and therefore potentially European architectural influences), David Schaepe's recent archaeological surveys of the lower Fraser Canyon rock wall structures suggest that wooden defensive palisades may also have long predated European visits and the associated early-nineteenth-century attacks by the Lekwiltok. Associated with a hilltop settlement at the mouth of the Fraser Canyon is a series of large linear postholes. These are ancient, well predating any European contact. Such features, coupled with the associated rock walls, Schaepe has concluded, are clear examples of collective action and centralized political authority.[60] Even more recently, archaeological examinations slightly farther north on the coast suggest that the Fraser Canyon fortification may not be unique in this regard.[61]

Some additional indication of the antiquity of Coast Salish fortified villages can also be gleaned from the historical record. In the mid-nineteenth century, George Gibbs observed a six-foot-deep, eight-foot-wide trench near Victoria which the local people explained was part of a defensive structure. From colonial governor James Douglas, Gibbs learned that such features were commonly found around Vancouver Island. An indication of the antiquity of these structures is suggested when Gibbs recorded that the local Indigenous people "had no tradition of their origin."[62] Similar accounts stating that the fortifications were so old that the local Indigenous population could not remember their original construction have been collected and cited by Grant Keddie, head of archaeology at the Royal British Columbia Museum, in a series of articles on "Aboriginal Defensive Sites" published in *Discovery Magazine*. For example, Keddie quotes Martha Douglas, Governor Douglas's daughter, describing two Coast Salish fortifications near present-day Victoria which the local Indigenous population considered ancient: "On asking the Indians about its origin they all say it was made by the old people who inhabited the country before them and they know nothing more about it."[63]

Gary Coupland argues that Northwest Coast warfare can be divided into two distinctive regional types: north coast (Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw and north), and south coast (Salish). While revenge raiding was no doubt common to both groups, Coupland alleges that the former were primarily offensive and motivated by economic factors, while the latter were defensive and largely non-economic. This, Coupland states, is shown archaeologically by the large number of defensive sites among the Coast Salish, particularly around the border zone between the north

and the south.[64] Whatever the merits of Coupland's economic determinist interpretation, the archaeological evidence there complements what Schaepe has documented in the lower Fraser Canyon and clearly shows that fortified structures did exist among the Coast Salish in the 1790s; the Spaniards, it seems, simply did not mention them, whereas the British referred only to ones that particularly intrigued them.[65]

The existence of pre-contact fortified villages, however, does not necessarily mean they were built and occupied by people whose leaders exercised centralized political authority over groups larger than an extended family. As Keddie points out, although "the very nature of a defensive village would demand greater social cooperation for group survival," accepting the idea that fortified Salish villages existed doesn't alone require that centralized leadership existed at the same time. Moreover, if the fortifications are indicative of the existence of some degree of political and social unity, they do not clarify the expression it took, or its extent – certainly they do not verify the existence of multi-village chiefdoms.

For insights into sociopolitical conditions, it is useful to ask against whom were the fortifications designed to protect? Historical geographer Robert Galois addresses this question while documenting how the Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw were first exposed to significant European contact in the 1780s at the commencement of the maritime fur trade. He demonstrates that until 1800, most Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw-European trade occurred overland across Vancouver Island via Nuu-chah-nulth middlemen.[66] After 1800, the centre of the maritime fur trade shifted from Clayoquot and Nootka Sounds to "Newitty," in Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw territory on the extreme north end of Vancouver Island.[67]

Spanish and British sources place the southern boundary of Lekwiltok territory at Topaz Harbour in 1792. Spanish observers (filtered through Wagner's translations) also mention what appear to be regionally hegemonic leaders among the Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw.[68] Of significance, as he travelled northward, Vancouver also observed a sudden and marked contrast between Salish and Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw weaponry. Everywhere they went, the British encountered Salish armed with bows, arrows, and clubs. And while the tips of many Salish projectiles were made with reprocessed European iron, among the Lekwiltok, Vancouver found a veritable artillery of European-manufactured firearms, and numerous men so "dexterous" in the use of muskets that they could have "been accustomed to fire arms from the earliest infancy."[69]

Collectively, the archaeological and historical evidence suggests that it is likely that Lekwiltok raiding of Coast Salish communities predated the visit of Vancouver and Galiano-Valdes. One might assume that warfare increased significantly thereafter as a result of Kwakwaka'wakw numerical superiority and their monopolistic access to European weaponry.[70] Galois documents that by 1835 the Lekwiltok had annexed Coast Salish territory as far south as the islands off Campbell River, but it is unclear how fast this process occurred, or the extent to which direct annexation of northern Salish territory relates to raiding of more southernly Salish communities in Georgia Strait, the Fraser River, and Puget Sound.

What, then, should we make of the alleged link between Lekwiltok raiding and increased Salish centralization? Suttles discusses the numerous Spanish references to Coast Salish people armed with bows and arrows and wearing Indigenous armour (an observation corroborated by Vancouver). Suttles concludes from these sources that the "evidence on conflict therefore does not contradict the image we get from most ethnographies – of people who generally, out of enlightened self-interest maintained friendly relations with their neighbours, regardless of language boundaries, but were in conflict with more distant groups."[71] Although this interpretation has common-sense appeal, the archival record is actually ambiguous with regard to whether military aggression was related to geographic propinquity. In particular, there is no evidence to suggest that relations with neighbours were necessarily any less violent than those with more distant groups. The assumed relationship between collective defence and centralized leadership as expressed in shared concepts of political unity and regional identity, by extension, are just as difficult to assess from these records.

For example, as mentioned, Suttles quotes Quimper's description of the people of Port Discovery as "carrying on continual warfare with those on the north side, thus accounting for the fact that the beaches are strewn with the harpooned heads of their enemies."[72] On the basis of ethnographic evidence gathered from informants of the mid-twentieth century, Suttles suggests that the "north side" may refer to the slightly more distant Cowichan rather than the Songhees. The placement of Quimper's statement in the paragraph following his description of the Songhees people of the north side of the strait, and the fact that Quimper never ventured into Haro Strait to meet the Cowichan, indicates that it was actually more likely to have been the Songhees to which the Port Discovery people were referring. However, even if we accept that it

might have been the Cowichan, should we consider them a "distant group"? By canoe in good weather, it is possible to travel from the Cowichan villages on Salt Spring Island to Port Discovery in a single day.

If the Spanish and British records are opaque on whether there existed an inverse relationship between geographic closeness and violence, the subsequent observations of HBC men are much less so. A generation after Captain Vancouver's voyage, the *Fort Langley Journal* documents a great deal of warfare among and between the central Coast Salish and their neighbours, particularly the Lekwiltok. From these records, it appears that contrary to Suttles's observation, and supportive of Jay Miller's approach, watersheds (and by extension languages) may actually have been the best indicators of collective identity and cooperative political action, for clearly they played a role in shaping responses to aggression. The *Journal* describes twenty attacks by various Salish warriors/raiders over a three-year period. An additional ten conflicts are mentioned involving various Coast Salish groups and the Lekwiltok. Most attacks involved multiple deaths, pillaging, and slave raiding. Moreover, they also demonstrate the shifting nature of Coast Salish alliances during this period. For example, 80 per cent of the conflicts among Halkomelem speakers pit Vancouver Island and mainland downriver speakers against people who spoke the central and upper mainland Fraser Valley dialects. The Cowichan of Vancouver Island, the most populous group and one described as having additional large summer villages near the mouth of the Fraser River, are by far the most common aggressors, and the upriver Chilliwack (whom records reveal to have moved more recently into the Fraser Valley from the neighbouring Chilliwack River watershed to the south and therefore only recently adopted the Halqemeylem language) are the most common recipients of their aggression.[73] Given the localized view of Coast Salish society offered to the men behind the fort's palisades, it is reasonable to assume that additional undocumented raids occurred beyond their observation. Conflicts that involved raiders having to pass in front of the fort in order to reach their objective are no doubt overly represented. While there is nothing in the records to suggest that any of these raids represented coordinated attacks by one community on another (indeed, they more likely represented isolated ventures by clusters of likeminded young men seeking opportunistic targets to demonstrate the veracity of their warrior spirit power), they do reveal that raiding and warfare were as likely to occur between neighbouring communities as they were among those slightly more distantly located. And they

make clear that, taken as a whole, the Coast Salish people of the 1820s were involved in more internal conflicts than they were in contestations with the more distant Lekwiltok.

Smallpox

Any discussion of First Nations' history, as Ray Fogelson has argued, has to take into account the impact of introduced disease: "Drastically reduced populations are obviously decisive influences on the course of American Indian history, dramatically affecting social organization, the perception of traditions, religious conversion, revitalization movements, and a host of other domains. However, in the wake of numbing number counts, we have too few accounts of the native affective reactions and cognitive rationalizations of these catastrophic die-offs."[74] Reconstructions made from any of the early-contact-era records must take into account the fact that they describe Coast Salish communities earlier devastated by smallpox.[75] Thus we have to redefine what we mean by "contact."[76] What the earliest European observers documented was not traditional Coast Salish society on the verge of contact with Europeans. Introduced epidemic diseases had preceded direct contact by a decade.

In addition to Pantoja's cryptic observations of pox-scarred one-eyed smallpox survivors, Captain Vancouver and his crew describe numerous Salish people throughout Puget Sound and Georgia Strait as "horribly pitted" with smallpox scars. Vancouver and his officers report seeing human skeletons "promiscuously scattered about the beach in great numbers" and numerous abandoned villages "now fallen into decay; their inside, as well as a small surrounding space that appeared to have been formerly occupied, were overrun with weeds." The largest of these abandoned villages Vancouver estimated "had not been inhabited for five or six years, as brambles and bushes were growing up a considerable height."[77] What the earliest Europeans witnessed was a population that had just suffered massive and sudden population loss. The social and political implications of this loss have yet to be fully considered.[78]

If in "They Recognize No Superior Chief" Suttles is silent on the matter of disease, he does account for it in other publications.[79] However, he does so in a manner which consistently privileges Robert Boyd's analysis over that of Cole Harris.[80] Boyd's study is broadly based and has been criticized by Harris for lacking local

and regional sensitivity.[81] Boyd dates the original epidemic as occurring sometime in the late 1770s and claims that it likely impacted all Northwest Coast Indigenous people.[82] Harris's study, on the other hand, dates the epidemic at 1782, and demonstrates that while it devastated the Chinook and Coast Salish, it did not reach the more northern Nuu-chah-nulth and Kwakwaka'wakw. Central to Harris's argument is the fact that Captain Vancouver recorded a marked increase in population density upon leaving Salish territory and entering Johnstone Strait. The Kwakwaka'wakw region is described as "infinitely more populous than the shores of the gulf of Georgia," and within it, Vancouver finds none of the promiscuously scattered human remains or empty villages that he described as common in the Salish Sea region. My own assessment of the primary documents confirms Harris's assessment of the date and geographic extent of the epidemic.[83] Robert Galois's complementary analysis likewise supports Harris's interpretation. After conducting an exhaustive review of the early maritime fur trade records, Galois concluded that the historical record was silent on smallpox among the Kwakwaka'wakw at this early time. Rather, a demographic decline consistent with the introduction of a deadly European crowd disease did not occur among the Kwakwaka'wakw until the 1820s.[84]

Accepting Boyd's argument for a Northwest Coast–wide pandemic as Suttles does is to implicitly create the impression that the noncentralized authority of the Salish is reflective of the same historical processes that shaped the more centralized social structures of the Nuu-chah-nulth and Kwakwaka'wakw. It fails to take into account the fact that ethnographic differences between the Salish and Nuu-chah-nulth/Kwakwaka'wakw may reflect the earlier devastation of Salish society by disease. The difficulty, however, is that the historical evidence is insufficiently robust to tell what effects the first smallpox epidemic had upon Coast Salish social and political organization. We know that smallpox was a major historic event in Coast Salish society and that its physical and emotional toll was terrible. But was the smallpox event so profound that it transformed the social structures that underlay Coast Salish society? Or, on the other hand, were the underlying social structures so well entrenched that, although devastating, the epidemic could not lead to structural change?

George Guilmet (and colleagues) raised similar questions in their 1991 article studying the "legacy of introduced diseases" among the southern Coast Salish. There they theorize that

> the indigenous cultures observed by members of the Vancouver expedition probably had already been modified by the presence of smallpox. Some cumulated cultural traditions may have been lost, and social institutions were perhaps simpler than before. In oral based societies … the effect of the loss of [elders] as role models for children and adults had the potential of severely impacting social organization and stability. The loss of continuity in family and extended kin-based social units through the death of infants, spouses, grandparents, and other relatives may have led to significant social change … The impact on the metaphysical and moral systems from the loss of shamans from disease, or from murder in the face of the unexplained death of patients … should not be underestimated … In addition to the impact on social organization and the philosophical system, disease-based depopulation probably diminished the ability of the local culture to maintain certain social institutions and accompanying rituals that required a minimum number of members of specific categories to be able to function normally.[85]

Lending credence to this sort of academic supposition are First Nations' oral histories and associated Indigenous interpretations of the impacts of the first major smallpox epidemic. Swinomish chief Martin Sampson wrote in the 1970s that Europeans "never saw the Indians at their full numbers and the peak of their culture. What they found was the broken remnant of a once-powerful people, reduced to this state by disease."[86] Albert Louie of Chilliwack, in 1965, explained that smallpox "killed, oh, half the Indians all around the Fraser River there."[87] Old Pierre of Katzie described in 1935 how "the wind carried the smallpox sickness among them. Some crawled away into the woods to die; many died in their homes. Altogether about three-quarters of the Indians perished."[88]

If the evidence for the Coast Salish area is sufficient only for preliminary speculation about the cultural and political consequences of smallpox, perhaps comparisons with other North American societies who suffered massive epidemics may provide valuable insights. For example, in conducting an ethnohistorical study of the Indigenous people of northwestern Mexico, Daniel Reff was puzzled by the stark contrast between the Spanish descriptions from the early 1500s and those of later observers. He notes that the earliest Spanish explorers "often mentioned or alluded to 'kingdoms' with sizable populations and complex economic and sociopolitical systems. By contrast, the later Jesuits made little or no mention of 'kingdoms' and generally described

native populations in terms of small, dispersed rancherias, which lacked sophisticated economic and sociopolitical systems." These later Jesuit observations correspond with the current anthropological models describing northwest Mexican Indigenous society.[89] Reff attributes this discrepancy to epidemic diseases, many of which were introduced through Indigenous trade networks from distant European outposts. The disease, therefore, often preceded the arrival of those Europeans who carried the disease themselves. Reff concludes,

> Significant disease-induced reductions in population and the collapse of productive strategies must have had an impact on native social organization … Anthropologists traditionally have inferred that aboriginal groups such as the Opata, Tarahumara, Yaqui, and Pima Alto lived in largely autonomous rancherias, headed by respected elders and war captains and organized in terms of bilateral kinship. This view of native social organization has been based almost entirely on historical materials such as kin terminologies from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and on ethnographic field work carried out in the last century. Researchers have largely ignored the comments of earlier Jesuit observers.[90]

Although Reff's study of cultural change among northwest Mexican Indigenous societies should not be applied casually to the Coast Salish, it nonetheless serves as a reminder of the extent to which depopulation can affect Indigenous social structures. The historical experience of the Coast Salish in this respect remains to be fully determined and is one of the outstanding challenges that historians of the region face.

Conclusion

There was a time when historians felt they could review documents and speak about contact and its effects with confidence. The event was alternatively the arrival of either European explorers or non-Native settlers; and everything subsequent represented a stage in the process of Indigenous social, economic, and political marginalization and cultural degradation. Stemming from this approach was the assumption that whatever the earliest newcomers described was necessarily Indigenous society at its pinnacle, and what came later was a compromised fragment of what had been. Such views, emerging as they did from the perspectives of European settlers themselves, acted as handmaidens for colonial policymakers and apologists who justified actions with teleological logic.

Likewise, not so long ago, anthropologists working on the West Coast were able to engage in memory ethnography and participant observation and feel confident that the structures their informants described as having characterized their grandparents' world accurately represented the way society functioned before contact induced change – before cultural contamination. Subsequent generations of humanists and social scientists, such as those involved in the debate over the historical expressions of Coast Salish leadership collective identity and political authority discussed earlier, have determined that the process was more complicated. Indigenous people had more agency than previously thought, and colonial agendas and actions were often more contradictory than a straightforward reading of policy documents allowed. And indeed, some of the consequences of contact and colonial policy were even contrary to what people at the time expected.

What is becoming clearer is that there is no conclusive answer to the debate over whether the Coast Salish were traditionally centralized or decentralized. If anything, the historical sources are perhaps most useful for what they reveal about the limitations of what we as historians can know about the Coast Salish past, highlighting as they do just how much we do not know. As such, these sources suggest ways in which we can reframe the questions we are asking about this early time period. For even without being able to confidently pierce the contact-era barrier created by smallpox to see how Salish societies were structured prior to this devastating disruption, the evidence from subsequent eras (and the insights gleaned from an examination of multiple social geographies within Coast Salish territory) speak to a remarkable degree of political elasticity and a corresponding willingness on the part of Coast Salish communities (variously defined) to accommodate a wide range of political expressions.

Such societal elasticity hints at the extent to which agency was wielded by familial collectives and Salish individuals. At times certain prominent men – either seizing opportunities created by sudden smallpox-induced depopulation, responding to the crisis of their more populous northern neighbours having access to Western firearms, embracing the economic opportunities associated with the fur trade, or taking advantage of colonial efforts to consolidate tribes and displace older prerogatives with the powers of government-recognized Indian chiefs – rose to prominence and exercised considerable political authority over a wide range of people and sometimes multiple settlements. Whether such also occurred prior to contact in response to other Indigenous events is impossible to

tell, but certainly it is not impossible; and in some places at some times, it appears to have been likely. But so too is it impossible to determine if the seemingly more sporadic historical expressions of such centralized authority documented since 1790 are necessarily innovations or whether they harken back to what may have been more formal political institutions that existed pre-contact – similar to those expressed by Salish people's northern neighbours, who apparently escaped that first devastating epidemic in 1782. It is clear that since that time, whatever change has occurred within Coast Salish society towards centralization or decentralization has not been unidirectional. And there is nothing to suggest that we should expect it to be so in the future.

NOTES

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1 Bruce G. Miller and Daniel L. Boxberger, "Creating Chiefdoms: The Puget Sound Case," *Ethnohistory* 41/2 (spring 1994): 267.
2 Bill Angelbeck and Erick McLay, "The Battle of Maple Bay: Dynamics of Coast Salish Political Organization through Oral Histories," *Ethnohistory* 58/3 (summer 2011): 359–92.
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5 Marshall Sahlins, *Historical Metaphor and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981).
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7 Wayne Suttles, "They Recognize No Superior Chief: The Strait of Juan De Fuca in the 1790's," in *Culturas de la Costa Noroeste de America*, ed. Jose Luis Peset (Madrid: Turner Libros, 1992), 252. For a detailed ethnographic discussion of Coast Salish social structures, see Wayne Suttles, "Private Knowledge, Morality, and Social Classes among the Coast Salish"; "Affinal Ties, Subsistence, and Prestige among the Coast Salish"; "Variation in Habitat and Culture on the Northwest Coast"; and "Coping with Abundance: Subsistence on the Northwest Coast," all of which are reproduced in Wayne Suttles, *Coast Salish Essays* (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1987).
8 Kenneth D. Tollefson, "The Snoqualmie: A Puget Sound Chiefdom," *Ethnology* 26/2 (April 1987): 121–36. See also Kenneth D. Tollefson, "Political Organization of the Duwamish," *Ethnology* 28/1 (1989): 135–50.
9 Tollefson, "Snoqualmie," 123.
10 For example, Alice Kehoe's survey text *North American Indians: A Comprehensive Account*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1992), and Jean Arnold's *The Origins of a Pacific Coast Chiefdom: The Chumash of the Channel Islands* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2001).
11 Kenneth D. Tollefson, "In Defense of a Snoqualmie Political Chiefdom Model," *Ethnohistory* 43/1 (winter 1996): 145–71.
12 Miller and Boxberger, "Creating Chiefdoms." Though as Miller and Boxberger point out, pressure should be brought to bear on Western authorities to adjust their definitions of meaningful collective association to accommodate Indigenous realities, rather than expecting Indigenous people to prove they can meet European standards of political affiliation.

13 Jay Miller, *Lushootseed Culture and the Shamanic Odyssey: An Anchored Radiance* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 8. See also Jay Miller, "Back to Basics," *Ethnohistory* 44/2 (1997): 375.
14 A renaissance that, fifty years later, continues to gain momentum despite the increased emphasis on the local village community being fostered by American and Canadian government funding programs.
15 Wayne Suttles, "The Persistence of Intervillage Ties Among the Coast Salish," *Ethnology* 2/4 (October 1963): 512–25.
16 Miller, *Anchored Radiance*.
17 David M. Schaepe, "Rock Fortifications: Archaeological Insights into Pre-Contact Warfare and Sociopolitical Organization Among the Stó:lō of the Lower Fraser River Canyon, BC," *American Antiquity* 71/4 (2006): 671–705.
18 Angelbeck and McLay, "Battle of Maple Bay," 378, 380.
19 Miller and Boxberger, "Creating Chiefdoms," 274.
20 Suttles, "They Recognize No Superior Chief," 262.
21 Ibid., 261.
22 Cecil Jane, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-west Coast of America: Being the Narrative of the Voyage Made in the Year 1792 by the Schooners Sutil and Mexicana to Explore the Strait of Fuca* (London: Argonaut Press, 1930).
23 Pantoja in Henry Raup Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca* (Santa Ana, CA: Fine Arts Press, 1933), 255–6. Emphasis added.
24 Pantoja in Jane, *A Spanish Voyage*, 48. Emphasis added.
25 The use of the expression "pimply" is less indicative of smallpox than is the characteristic blindness in one eye. Survivors of variola major were typically blind in one eye and often suffered from scar tissue hanging over the sightless orifice.
26 I am indebted to Luisa Munoz from Spain (who was studying at UBC while I was a PhD student) for the time she took out of her busy schedule to compare the Wagner and Jane translations to Quimper's original.
27 There are many instances where the Wagner and Jane translations differ. To cite just a few prominent inconsistencies, at one point Wagner claims "twelve canoes" approached the Spanish ship, while the Jane translation mentions "two." The occupants of Wagner's twelve canoes, "sold us some bows, arrows, clubs and three paddles for the canoe, as those who had let us have it went off without troubling to leave it provided with that accessory" (264). The men in Jane's two canoes "sold us some bows arrows, machetes and three small casks for the canoe, since those who had let us have the canoe had gone away without consenting to leave us these things" (55). Wagner quotes Pantoja as writing, "Although in these places

we do not find that pleasant view which a diversity of trees and young plants presents, nor the elegance of flowers and beauty of fruits, nor the variety of animals and birds; while the ear also misses the pleasant song of the latter, yet the observer will not fail to find many opportunities to admire the works of nature and divert his thoughts in contemplating the enormous masses of the mountains" (265). Jane's translation of the same passage reads, "It would certainly be impossible to find a more delightful view than that which is here presented by the diversity of trees and shrubs, by the loveliness of the flowers and the beauty of the fruit, by the variety of the animals and birds. When to this is added the pleasure of listening to the song of the birds the observer is afforded many occasions for admiring the works of nature and for delighting his senses as he contemplates the majestic outlines of the mountains" (57).

28 Luisa Munoz to author, 14 May 1998, author's personal collection.

29 J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

30 James Axtell, *Natives and Newcomers: The Colonial Origins of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

31 Those arguing enrichment include Joyce Wike, "The Effects of the Maritime Fur Trade on Northwest Coast Indian Society" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1951); Wilson Duff, *The Indian History of British Columbia*, vol. 1, *The Impact of the White Man*, Anthropology in British Columbia, Memoir No. 5 (Victoria: Provincial Museum of British Columbia, 1964); and Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774–1890* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992). Prominent opponents of the enrichment thesis include Barry M. Gough, *Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846–90* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1984); and James R. Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785–1841* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992). Seminal in shifting attention away from the early to mid-nineteenth century was Celia Haig-Brown's *Resistance and Renewal: Surviving the Indian Residential School* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1988).

32 Cole Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997); Alexandra Harman's *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities Around Puget Sound* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999); Lissa Wadewitz, *The Nature of Borders: Salmon and Boundaries in the Salish Sea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press; Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).

33 See Arthur J. Ray, *Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of the Hudson Bay, 1660–1870*

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974); and Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, *"Give Us Good Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978). For examples of other more controversial studies which focus on non-economic factors, see Calvin Martin's *Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Abraham Rotstein's "Trade and Politics: An Institutional Approach," *Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology* 3 (1972): 1–28. For a detailed critique of Martin's thesis, consult Kerry Abel and Jean Friesen, eds., *Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1991).

34 Leland Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). This work is an extension and elaboration of Donald's earlier article-length studies: "The Slave Trade on the Northwest Coast of North America," *Research in Economic Anthropology* 6 (1984): 121–58; Donald Mitchell, "Predatory Warfare, Social Status, and the North Pacific Slave Trade," *Ethnology* 73 (1984): 39–48; Donald Mitchell, "A Demographic Profile of Northwest Coast Slavery," in Marc Thompson et al., *Status Structure and Stratification: Current Archaeological Reconstructions* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), 227–36; Leland Donald, "Slave Raiding on the North Pacific Coast," in *Native People, Native Lands*, ed. Bruce Alden Cox (Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1988), 161–72.

35 W. Kaye Lamb, ed., *The Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser, 1806–1808* (Toronto: MacMillan Company of Canada, 1960), 104.

36 Ibid., 107.

37 Personal communication with Matilda Gutierrez of Chawathil, August 1998.

38 Lamb, *Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser*, 103.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 For a thoughtful discussion of the way traders' expectations shaped the way they described and related to Indigenous people of the Pacific Slope, see Elizabeth Vibert, "Real Men Hunt Buffalo: Masculinity, Race and Class in British Fur Traders' Narratives," *Gender and History* 8/1 (April 1996): 4–21. François N. Annance, "A Journal of a Voyage from Fort George Columbia River to Fraser River in the Winter of 1824 and 1825," Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Archives of Manitoba, B/76/a/1.

42 T.C. Elliot, ed., "The Journal of John Work, November and December, 1824," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 3/3 (July 1912): 198–228.

43 G. Dickey, ed., *Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually, 1833–1859* (Tacoma, WA: Fort Nisqually Historical Site, 1983).
44 For an ethnographic discussion of the Coast Salish prophet dance phenomenon, see Wayne Suttles, "The Plateau Prophet Dance Among the Coast Salish," in Suttles, *Coast Salish Essays* (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1987), 152–98. See also June McCormick Collins, *Valley of the Spirits: The Upper Skagit Indians of Western Washington* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).
45 See Keith Thor Carlson, "Prophesy," in Keith Thor Carlson, ed., *A Stó:lō–Coast Salish Historical Atlas* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2001), 154–61.
46 Dickey, *Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*.
47 "James Douglas to Governor James Simpson, Fort Vancouver, 18, March, 1838," Appendix A, in E.E. Rich, ed., *The Letters of John McLaughlin from Fort Vancouver to the Governor and Committee*, First Series, 1825–38, vol. 4 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1991), 280–1.
48 Suttles, "They Recognize No Superior Chief," 253.
49 Ibid., 252–3.
50 Miller and Boxberger, "Creating Chiefdoms," 274; Suttles, "They Recognize No Superior Chief," 261.
51 Lamb, *A Voyage of Discovery*, 604. See also Menzies's description of this same fortified village. Based upon his observations, Menzies estimates that the village had only recently been abandoned. Menzies also describes a particularly large ornate house in this village which he speculates must have been "the residence of the Chief or some family of distinction." C.F. Newcombe, ed., *Menzie's Journals of Vancouver's Voyage*, Victoria: Archives of British Columbia, Memoir No. 5 (1923), 66–7.
52 Lamb, *Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser*, 106.
53 Michael Kew, personal communication, Stó:lō Tribal Council grounds, Chilliwack, BC, May 1994.
54 Lamb, *Letters and Journals of Simon Fraser*, 82.
55 Charles Wilks, unpublished manuscript, British Columbia Archives and Records Service (henceforth BCARS), 322.
56 Reverend DeSmet, *Oregon Missions and Travels to the Rocky Mountains in 1845* (New York: 1847), 56.
57 Paul Kane, *Wanderings of an Artist* (London, 1859), 220.
58 A.C. Anderson, "Notes on the Indian Tribes of British North America and the Northwest Coast," copy on file at Stó:lō Nation Archives. Originally at BCARS.
59 George Gibbs, "Journal of an Expedition to Fraser River," WA-Mss S-1810, Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Yale University, Hartford, CT.

60 David Schaepe, "Rock Fortifications: Archaeological Insights into Pre-contact Warfare and Sociopolitical Organization Among the Stó:lō of the Lower Fraser River Canyon, B.C.," *American Antiquity* 4/71 (2007): 671–705.

61 See two studies of immediate pre-contact Coast Salish defensive sites with an eye to their implications for political authority: William Angelbeck, "'They Recognize No Superior Chief': Power, Practice, Anarchism and Warfare in the Coast Salish Past" (PhD diss., Department of Anthropology, University of British Columbia, 2009); and Kisha Suprenant, "Inscribing Identities on the Landscape: A Spatial Exploration of Archaeological Rock Features in the Lower Fraser River Canyon" (PhD diss., Department of Anthropology, University of British Columbia, 2011).

62 George Gibbs, *Ethnology Manuscript Material, Number 1192* (Washington, DC: National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution, 1858), 223.

63 Martha Douglas's diary, quoted in Grant Keddie, "Aboriginal Defensive Sites, Part 2: Amateur Archaeology Begins," *Discovery, The Magazine of the Royal British Columbia Museum* 24/9 (February 1997): 5.

64 Gary Coupland, "Warfare and Social Complexity on the Northwest Coast," in *Cultures in Conflict: Current Archaeological Perspectives*, ed. Diana Tkaczuk and Brian C. Vivian (Calgary: University of Calgary, Archaeological Association, 1989), 205–14.

65 The first reference I can remember coming across that described fortified Coast Salish villages was by Cole Harris: "The fact that Vancouver's journals mention fortified villages and beacons, possibly watchtowers, 'so frequently erected in the more southerly parts of New Georgia,' and that there is abundant archaeological evidence of fortified, pre-contact sites around the Strait of Georgia implies that [Lekwiltok] raiding had been common before 1792." Descriptions of this sort, however, provide unique ethnographic challenges. More likely, the structures Vancouver referred to as being "so frequently erected in the more southerly parts of New Georgia" were not "fortified villages," as Harris states, but rather fish drying racks. Likewise, what Harris interpreted as "beacons, possibly watchtowers," were more likely poles used to hold nets used in catching waterfowl. Cole Harris, "Voices of Smallpox around the Strait of Georgia," in Cole Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 15.

66 Robert Galois, *Kwakwa̱ka'wakw Settlements, 1775–1920: A Geographical Analysis and Gazetteer* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), 27.

67 Ibid., 28.

68 Wagner, *Spanish Explorations*, 222–3.
69 Lamb, *A Voyage of Discovery*, 613.
70 Galois, *Kwakwaka'wakw Settlements*, 235.
71 Suttles, "They Recognize No Superior Chief," 256.
72 Wagner, *Spanish Explorations*, 131.
73 See Keith Thor Carlson, "Intercommunity Conflicts," in Carlson, *A Stó:lō–Coast Salish Historical Atlas*, 46–7. See also Keith Thor Carlson, *The Power of Place, the Problem of Time: Aboriginal Identity and Historical Consciousness in the Cauldron of Colonialism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), chapter 5.
74 Ray Fogelson, "Ethnohistory of Events and Nonevents," *Ethnohistory* 36/2 (spring 1989): 139.
75 See Harris, "Voices of Smallpox," 3–30; Robert Boyd, "Commentary on Early Contact-Era Smallpox in the Pacific Northwest," *Ethnohistory* 43/2 (spring 1996): 307–28; Robert Boyd, "Smallpox in the Pacific Northwest: The First Epidemics," *BC Studies* 101 (spring 1994): 5–39; and also Keith Thor Carlson, "First Contact: Smallpox: 'A Sickness That No Medicine Could Cure, and No Person Escape,'" in Keith Thor Carlson, *You Are Asked to Witness: The Stó:lō in Canada's Pacific Coast History* (Chilliwack, BC: Stó:lō Heritage Trust, 1997), 27–40.
76 I have discussed this in more detail elsewhere: Keith Thor Carlson, "Reflections on Indigenous History and Memory: Reconstructing and Reconsidering Contact," in John Lutz, ed., *Myth and Memory: Stories of Indigenous-European Contact* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 46–68.
77 Lamb, *A Voyage of Discovery*, 528, 538, 539, 540, 568, 575, 578n3, 560.
78 An early attempt at assessing the social and cultural implications of smallpox on Coast Salish people is found in George M. Guilmet, Robert Boyd, David L. Whitehead, and Nile Thompson's pioneering work "The Legacy of Introduced Disease on the Southern Coast Salish," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 15/4 (1991): 1–32. See also "From the Great Flood to Smallpox," in Carlson, *The Power of Place, the Problem of Time*, 79–112.
79 See Suttles, "The Ethnographic Significance of the Fort Langley Journals," an epilogue in Morag McLaughlin, ed., *The Fort Langley Journals* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998). In a conversation shortly before his passing, Wayne Suttles expressed the opinion that in the Harris-Boyd debate "I am inclined to follow Boyd" (personal communication, 17 April 1997).
80 Robert T. Boyd, "Demographic History, 1774–1884," in Wayne Suttles, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 7, *Northwest Coast* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990), 135–48.
81 Harris, "Voices of Smallpox."

82 For Boyd's more recent defence of his interpretation see "Commentary on Early Contact-Era Smallpox in the Pacific Northwest," *Ethnohistory* 43/2 (spring 1996): 307–28.
83 Carlson, *The Power of Place, the Problem of Time*, 79–112.
84 Robert Galois, *Kwakwa̲ka̲'wakw Settlements, 1775–1920: A Geographical Analysis and Gazetteer* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), 39–40.
85 Guilmet et al., "Legacy of Introduced Disease," 10.
86 Martin Sampson, *Indians of Skagit County*, Skagit County Historical Series 2 (Mount Vernon, WA: Skagit County Historical Society, 1972), p. I. Cited in Cole Harris, "Social Power and Cultural Power in Pre-Colonial British Columbia," *BC Studies* 115/116 (autumn/winter 1997/8): 69.
87 Albert Louis in conversation with Oliver Wells, 28 July 1965 (copy on file at the Stó:lō Nation Archives).
88 Old Pierre in Diamond Jenness, "Faith of a Coast Salish Indian," in *Anthropology in British Columbia – Memoirs 3*, ed. Wilson Duff (Victoria: British Columbia Provincial Museum, 1955), 34.
89 Daniel T. Reff, *Disease, Depopulation, and Culture Change in Northwestern New Spain, 1518–1764* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991), 13. I am grateful to Cole Harris for drawing my attention to Reff's publication.
90 Ibid., 245.